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LENDER LIABILITY IN MISSOURI:
BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS
OR MERELY BITING BACK?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent flood of lawsuits brought against financial lenders by borrowers
is collectively known as lender liability lawsuits. These lawsuits have dramatically changed the bafiking industry and the fundamental relationship
between lenders and borrowers. The figures awarded to plaintiffs against

lenders have sent shockwaves throughout the banking industry. In 1987,
juries returned seven of the top ten awards against lenders.' Though plaintiff-

borrowers did not fare as well in 1988,2 lender liability still poses a very
real threat for the financial lending community.
A.

Scope

Part II of this Article surveys the various common law (contract and
tort) theories which plaintiffs have used against lending institutions. Part
III examines the public policy considerations surrounding lender liability.
Finally, Part IV of this Article suggests ways in which lending institutions
might try to limit their liability exposure or otherwise protect themselves.
focus is the application of Missouri law to lender liability
This Article's
3
theqries.
B.

Overview

What is lender liability? Though the phrase "lender liability" is relatively
new to legal jargon, this does not mean that courts are recognizing new
causes of action. Instead, lender liability denotes the application of already
recognized causes of action against lending institutions. One author suggests

1. McCabe, What Rough Beast ... ?, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 834 (Nov.
11, 1988).
2. See Forde, Court Tips Scale Toward Banks, AM. BANKER, Oct. 25, 1988,
at 10. Statistics for 1988 indicated that jury verdicts against lenders failed to make
the list of top ten awards. See Sella, The Ten Largest Jury Verdicts of 1988,

A.B.A. J., Mar. 1989, at 45.
3. Where no Missouri authority exists to support (or deny) a particular
theory, leading cases from other jurisdictions are noted.
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this definition: "Taken together, lender liability claims are simply those
that arise from a financial relationship which is, or becomes, or is perceived
to be, one in which economic leverage is too one-sided and may have been
abused.

' 4

The practitioner should recognize the elements of lender liability theories
from her first year law study. The law supporting lender liability has
remained relatively constant. Only the facts, or more appropriately, the
defendants, have changed. To the practitioner, this should be a relief, as
case law abounds under the various theories. As an advocate, the practitioner's job will be to find the appropriate cause of action for her client's
claim. Subsequently, the practitioner must tailor that cause of action to
include those activities carried on by the lender.
How did the notion of borrowers suing lenders become so pervasive?

Edwin A. McCabe offers an explanation in his excellent article entitled
"What Rough Beast ... ?":

How in the world did lenders get themselves into this much trouble? Little
more than two decades ago, the courtroom view of the loan gone bad
was quite different. Banks only went to court to collect. Debtors (a/k/a
deadbeats) made noise, offered excuses, ranted and raved. But there were
truly only two questions to be asked: Did you borrow the money? Did
you pay it back? If the answers were "yes" and "no" respectively, the
case was over. Promissory notes and personal guarantees were the stuff
of summary judgment.
...

the banking industry [went through a] ... revolution in the

1970s .... The banker who had once been thought to be approachable
only with hat in hand was suddenly advertising that he wanted to be
considered a friend .... Quick approval. Instant credit. Write your own

loan.
...Thus was the lender liability stage set. Borrowers were encouraged
to have high expectations. The public, and the businessman, responded.
In a time of spiralling inflation, it made good sense to borrow today and
to repay tomorrow in inflated dollars. And so they did. Lenders wanted
their business, made money by "selling" credit, wanted to be thought of
as friends. In such heady times, borrower and lender came naturally
together, particularly on the farm where land values soared and supported
heavy borrowing for equipment, and in the oil patch where only a fool
didn't borrow to get in on a price-per-barrel headed for $60, or maybe
even $100.
...When the crunch came, borrowers looked to their lenders to be
friends, to be the "partners in progress" they had once seemingly asked
to be. What they encountered instead were workouts, and too little sympathy and understanding, and sometimes simply panic. Bankers wanted
to revert to their more traditional role and to limit their courtroom
experience to the asking of the two questions: Did you borrow the money?
Did you repay it? Instead, they found themselves deep-pocket defendants,
and their borrowers represented by skillful trial lawyers working on con-

4. McCabe, supra note 1.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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tingent fees, ready to portray the lender not as the lofty source of financing
for America's businesses but as greedy and unprincipled. It was a whole
new game.'

C.

Theories Commonly Asserted

Plaintiffs have used a variety of legal theories, with varying degrees
of success, in pursuing causes of action against lending institutions. The
common law theories include both contract and tort actions. The contract
theories include: (1) breach of oral or written commitment to lend; (2)
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) waiver/estoppel.
The following tort theories have also been advanced: (1) fraudulent
misrepresentation (2) constructive fraud (also known as negligent misrepresentation) (3) economic duress (4) tortious interference with contract (5)
intentional infliction of emotional harm (6) defamation (7) prima facia tort
(8) breach of fiduciary duty (9) negligence, and (10) tortious breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. In addition, plaintiffs have also relied
on various state and federal statutes in an attempt to hold the creditor
liable. 6
D.

The Role of the Lender

In order to understand the public policy arguments surrounding lender
liability, it is essential to understand the role of the lender in the financial

5.

McCabe, supra note 1. See also Bock, You're Foreclosing? I'm Suing!;

Borrowers Are Fighting Bankers Who Use Heavy-Handed Tactics, TndE, May 9,
1988, at 68. The author notes:
While the increase in lawsuits can be attributed in part to growing litigiousness, some bankers have themselves to blame. In the early 1980's,
lenders aggressively sought new borrowers in farming and oil, pushing
generous loans under the presumption that the good times would keep on
rolling. But when the bottom fell out of petroleum and commodity prices,
many ventures were unable to meet payments. In some cases panicky bank
officers intervened too harshly, giving borrowers grounds to sue.
Id.
6. While important, the various statutory theories advanced by plaintiffs
are beyond the scope of this Article. Situations in which lenders are being held
liable when they foreclose on real property that subsequently turns out to contain
hazardous waste are of growing importance. For example, in United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986), the court held
that a foreclosing lender could be held liable as an owner for hazardous waste

site cleanup. For a discussion of the steps lenders should take to protect themselves
from exposure to environmental cleanup costs, see Mott, Minimizing Environmental
Liability for Lenders: The Most Common Mistakes, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 949
(Dec. 5, 1988); see also Gillon, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: The Impact of
Fleet Factors, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 698 (Mar. 20, 1989) (suggesting that "secured

creditors should avoid exerting any more control over the borrower, financial or
otherwise, than is necessary to preserve their security interests" to avoid being held
liable for hazardous waste cleanup).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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marketplace. Of course, the role of the lender differs depending on an
individual's perspective. To the attorney vigorously defending the lender,
the lender is a good samaritan extending financial assistance to another
friend in need. To the plaintiff's attorney seeking a huge jury verdict, the
lender is a greedmonger, or perhaps worse-the Benedict Arnold who betrays
the borrower when things get rough. In most instances, neither of these
two portrayals is accurate. The following explanation of the role of the
lender provides a starting point:
In economic terms, the lender is a middleman. The lender facilitates the
workings of the market for capital by matching sellers of the use of

capital, investors, with buyers of the use of capital, businessmen [borrowers]. For its service of matching buyers and sellers of capital, the
lender receives a part of the price paid for its use.'
In reality, lending is nothing more, nor less, than a business for profit.
In attempting to make a profit, the lender must meet the needs of its
customer, the borrower. Those lenders that the public perceives as serving
their needs best are the same lenders that attract new customers, grow,
and turn a bigger profit. Like any business, lenders must make tough
decisions. These decisions typically involve denying credit or foreclosing
when the borrower defaults. No one suggests that the law should hold
lenders responsible for all economic failures. However, lender liability
advocates suggest that lenders, like other businesses, should operate under
similar standards of good faith and reasonableness.
II.

A.

LEGAL THroms

Various Contract Theories

1. Breach of Written and Oral Commitments to Lend
Lenders and borrowers typically reduce loan negotiations into a set of
writings which become the basis of a loan agreement. In the context of
lender liability cases, generally two issues arise. First, did the parties intend
to enter into a loan agreement or were the writings exchanged between
them mere invitations to enter negotiations? Second, if the parties intended
to form a contractual relationship, is the contract, as written, sufficiently
definite to be enforceable?8 The following cases demonstrate ways borrowers

7. Note, The Growth of Lender Liability: An Economic Perspective, 21
GA. L. REv. 723, 743 (1987).

8. This issue also arises when the borrower alleges that the lender modified

the original loan agreement. This dispute generally occurs after the lender has

extended credit a number of times and the parties are negotiating over another
extension. The borrower typically alleges that the lender, by either his words or
actions, has modified the due date by granting another extension. Bahls, Termination
of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender Liability, 48 MONT. L. REv.
213, 220-21 (1986).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6

4

Rithie: Rithie: Lender Liability in Missouri

19891

LENDER LIABILITY IN MISSOURI

1013

have sought to hold lenders liable for breaching written commitments to
lend.
In Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Municipal Leasing Corp.,9 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court's finding that a letter
"announce[d] the commitment of funds by First Municipal Leasing Corporation ...

for the leasing of certain equipment" and was a binding

contract to lend money. 10 The lender argued that the letter was a mere
invitation to negotiate a loan agreement. 1' However, the letter contained
clear language, the name of the parties, the terms of the loan (including
the amount), and the conditions precedent.' 2 The district court therefore
found the letter constituted a valid agreement to loan money. 3
In 999 v. C.LT. Corp.,' 4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
a judgment for the borrower who alleged breach of an agreement to provide
financing.' 5 The borrower, a Nevada corporation, was in the process of
acquiring a financially troubled Missouri corporation, Bee Cee.16 The borrower entered into negotiations with the lender to obtain approximately
six million dollars in financing.' 7 The lender presented a handwritten letter
to the president of the borrower. The letter requested the borrower to
make a deposit of $25,000 and to submit an application for financing.' 8

At the request of the borrower, the lender outlined the terms of the proposed
financing agreement.' 9 The borrower then signed the letter. 20 Subsequently,
the lender attempted to add a $25,000 per month prepayment penalty as
a condition to the financing. 2' The borrower demanded the lender drop
the condition, but the lender refused. 22 The borrower obtained substitute
financing and the resulting delay allowed Bee Cee's unsecured creditors to
force the corporation into involuntary bankruptcy. 23
The borrower brought suit, charging that the breach of the financing
commitment had caused it to lose the opportunity to acquire Bee Cee.?

9. 716 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1983), aff'g, No. LR-C-80-276 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
10. Id.at 543-44.
11. Id.
12. Id. The district court determined that the borrower, Sterling Faucet, had
fulfilled the conditions precedent. Id.
13. Id.
14. 776 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985).
15. Id. at 867.
16. Id. at 867-68.
17. Id. at 868. The borrower planned to invest $300,000 in the Missouri
corporation. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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Unfortunately, the issue of whether such a letter formed a contract remains
unresolved. During pre-trial discovery, the defendant admitted that the
letter comprised an agreement.25 At trial, the jury awarded the borrower
$1.9 million which the court remitted to $925,000.26 On appeal, the lender
charged that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the lender's
motion to withdraw the admission.27 The appeals court affirmed the trial
court's decision.m
As both Sterling Faucett and 999 indicate, courts are willing to find
contractual relationships between borrower and lender, so long as the
agreement outlines the material terms with some degree of specificity. This
judicial interpretation indicates that lenders may not want to reduce the
negotiations into writing unless it is willing to extend credit. Similarly, if
the lender is not ready to extend credit, it should only reduce the "negotiations" into writing if it clearly indicates that the writing is not an
offer to lend. The writing should be only a mere representation of the
negotiation of the terms under which it will consider lending. It should
29
also clearly specify those terms to which the parties have not yet agreed.
0
Bank counsel should review all such letters.
In addition to breach of written commitments to lend, plaintiffs have
also sought to enforce oral commitments to lend. Like cases brought under
written commitments to lend, the issue usually is whether the terms agreed
upon, albeit verbally, are definite enough to enforce the contract.
For example, in Labor Discount Center, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust
Co.," the plaintiff brought an action against six banks alleging that the
banks breached an oral agreement to provide interim financing. 2 The trial
court held that the plaintiff failed to prove an enforceable contract for
lack of sufficiently definite terms. 3 The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed
the summary judgment, saying:
There was not ... any evidence as to due date, security, rate of interest,
time for payment, etc. Taken alone, the absence of any one of these terms

might not be of great significance; viewed collectively, however, their

25. Id.
26. Id. The jury returned the $1.9 million on two separate verdicts, one for
breach of contract and one for negligent misrepresentation. However, the court
allowed the borrower to accept only one verdict. When the lender moved for a
new trial, the court conditioned denial of a new trial on acceptance of the remittitur
by the borrower. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 873.
29. Bank Attorneys Outline Some Lender Liability Problems, 50 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 176 (Mar. 28, 1988).
30. Id.
31. 526 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
32. Id. at 418.
33. Id. at 419-20.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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absence is fatal and the alleged promise was correctly found by the trial
court to be too indefinite to admit of enforcement ... 34

In Dennis Chapman Toyota, Inc. v. Belle State Bank,15 another Missouri
case, a car dealership brought an action against a lender alleging breach
of an oral contract to lend money. The bank argued that any "alleged
contracts" to lend should have been in writing.

6

The Missouri Court of

Appeals said, "[W]e have the tentative opinion that a valid cause of action
for breach of an oral contract to lend money is recognized at law. ' 37 The
court then turned its attention to whether the contract was definite enough
to enforce.3 8 After citing a variety of cases which held contracts were held
unenforceable for lack of definiteness, 39 the court held that the oral contract
sued upon was too indefinite to enforce.4

Plaintiffs do occasionally win, and win big, under this cause of action.
For example, in Landes Construction Co. v. Royal Bank,4' the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an $18.5 million jury verdict based on
the lender's breach of an oral agreement to lend. Nevertheless, absent
lending documentation, borrowers face a difficult task of proving the parties
agreed to all of the material terms.

34. Id. at 425. It is interesting to note an additional argument raised by
defendants in Labor Discount. The defendants asserted that there could be no oral
agreement to extend additional financing because federal and state-mandated limits
prohibited them from making additional loans that would exceed the loan limits.
Id. at 422. The banks asserted that these federal and state statutes served as an
absolute defense. Id. The appellate court said: "It is our view that the statutes

are for the regulation of banking institutions and the officers thereof and not for
the frustration of well-meaning though unwary borrowers." Id. Nevertheless, the
appellate court noted that since such an additional loan would exceed the federal
and state loan limits, this provided at least some evidence that the loan officer
had not extended such an offer. Id.
35. 759 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
36. Id. at 334.
37. Id. (citing Wait v. First Midwest Bank-Danville, 142 Ill. App. 3d 703,
707, 491 N.E.2d 795, 800 (1986)).
38. Id.
39. McErlean v. Union Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 414
N.E.2d 128 (1980) (borrower brought action against commercial lender for breach
of oral and written contract to extend line of credit; appeals court affirmed trial
court's dismissal of the case, finding that the contract was too indefinite); Labor
Discount Center, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 526 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) (oral agreement to furnish interim financing to complete construction of
discount store too indefinite to be enforced); Malaker Corp. v. First Jersey Nat'l
Bank, 163 N.J. Super. 463, 395 A.2d 222 (1978), certification denied, 79 N.J. 488,
401 A.2d 243 (1979) (bank's alleged oral agreement to make an unrestricted line
of credit available to plaintiff was unenforceable as a matter of law because its
terms were not specifically described).
40. Dennis Chapman Toyota, 759 S.W.2d at 336. The court noted the
following terms were not established: (1) interest rate; (2) terms of repayment; and
(3) duration of line of credit. Id.
41. 833 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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2. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Every contract carries an implicit duty to act in good faith and deal
43 a
fairly with each party.42 In Martin v. Prier Brass Manufacturing Co.,
Missouri court noted this duty, saying:
It is a fundamental principle and concomitant of agreements that: 'Every
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and enforcement.' That duty prevents one party to the
contract to exercise a judgment conferred by the express terms of agreement
in such a manner as to evade the spirit of the transaction or as to deny
the other party the expected benefit of the contract."
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 400.1-203 provides: "Every contract
or duty within this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement." 45 Section 400.1-201(19) defines good faith
to be "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. ' 46 Where
the defendant is a merchant, Section 400.2-103(1)(b) provides that good
faith "means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in trade." 47
4
K.M. C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
represents the leading breach of
duty case in the lender liability area. The jury awarded plaintiff $7.5 million
for the bank's failure to make further advances under a discretionary line
of credit. 49 The plaintiff asserted that this refusal constituted bad faith.
The Sixth Circuit adjudged the lender's action by the objective standard
of whether a reasonable loan officer, with a fully secured loan, would
have refused to advance funds to the borrower without notice.50 Finding

42. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). See generally Comment, Good Faith Theories of Lender Liability, 48 LA. L. REv. 1181 (1988).
43. 710 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
44. Id. at 473 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CONTRAcTS § 205 (1981))
(emphasis added).
45. Mo. REv.
46. Mo. REv.
47. Mo. REv.
48.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 400.1-203 (1986).
§ 400.1-201(19) (1986).
§ 400.2-103(1)(b) (1986).

757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).

49. Id. at 754-55.
50. Id. at 760-61. The court noted:
[T]o a certain extent the conduct of [the lender] must be measured by
objective standards. While it is not necessary that [the loan officer] have
been correct in his understanding of the facts and circumstances pertinent

to his discussion not to advance funds for this court to find that he made
a valid business judgment in doing so, there must at least some objective
basis upon which a reasonable loan officer in the exercise of his discretion
would have acted in that manner.
Id. at 761 (emphasis in original).
In Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 533 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986), the court seemed to hold a holder of a note to a subjective
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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that ample evidence existed for the jury to determine that no reasonable
refused to advance funds,
loan officer, in the same situation, would have
5
the appeals court upheld the jury's verdict. '
Courts have been unwilling to find a lender liable for breaching its
duty of good faith when the lender calls the pure demand loan. For
example, in Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc.,52 the Court held that
U.C.C. Section 1-203, setting forth the good faith standard, was not
applicable because "[t]he parties by the demand note did not agree that
payment would be made only when demand was made in good faith but
agreed that payment would be made whenever demand was made." 53 The
rewrite the agreement to add this additional term of
Court would 5not
"good faith.'' 4
In Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 55 a Missouri appellate court
held that the lender breached its duty of good faith in declining to advance
funds under an irrevocable line of credit.5 6 The plaintiff, a real estate
developer, sued his lender alleging breach of contract and prima facia
tort.57

standard of good faith, saying:
In terms of insecurity ... a creditor acts in good faith who acts on what
he believes he knows, whether or not what he believes is actual. It is
enough that the creditor honestly believes that the payment of the debt
is impaired to act with good faith in the call for more collateral ....
To act with honesty in fact in the call for more collateral, and hence in
good faith under § 400.1-208, however, is to act without caprice or arbitrary
purpose. That is to say, the belief of insecurity which prompts the call
for more collateral may not be bereft of rational basis nor amount to an
open abuse of that discretionary power.
Id. at 533 (citing K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 761). The Rigby court suggested that
the standard of good faith under section 400.1-208, which allows a secured creditor
to demand additional credit "only if he in good faith believes that the prospect
of payment or performance is impaired," is less stringent and more subjective than
the commercial reasonableness and fair dealing requirement under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code as it applies to merchants. Id.
51. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 766.
52. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
53. Id. at 48.
54. Id. Note that the comment to section 1-208 of the U.C.C. supports the
Court's holding. It provides, in part: "Obviously this section has no application
to demand instruments or obligations whose very nature permits call at any time
with or without reason. This section applies only to an agreement or to paper
which in the first instance is payable at a future date." U.C.C. § 1-208 comment

(1989).
55.
56.
57.
the trial
and thus

715 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 954.
Id. at 946. As to the prima facie tort claim, the appellate court affirmed
court's ruling that the plaintiff had failed to show an intent to injure,
upheld the directed verdict on this issue. Id. at 948-49.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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The lender contended there was no substantial evidence that it had
breached a contract.58 Specifically, the lender argued that it cannot be liable
for breaching a contract to lend when the loan is payable on demand. 9
The lender also asserted that if there was a good faith duty to disburse
0
the funds, the plaintiff failed to make a submissible case on the issue.
The court initially determined that the loan instrument was not a demand
note, but rather a line of credit . 6 1 It then focused its attention to whether
the defendant enjoyed a right to refuse disbursal 6 2 Citing K.M.C. Co.,
the court noted that an implied duty to act in good faith may exist under
63
a line of credit contract.
The Shaughnessy court acknowledged that in Centerre the Western
District of Missouri had declined to impose a good faith obligation when
a bank calls a demand note. 4 The court reasoned that calling a demand
note is a "more onerous burden on the debtor than when a bank refuses
to disburse additional funds. ' ' 65 As a result no duty of good faith appeared
to exist in the context of a line of credit. In addition, the court distinguished
Centerre from K.M.C. Co.. In K.M.C Co., the lender had required the
borrower to deposit all of his receipts into a "blocked account." 66 When
the lender refused to advance funds, this in effect left the borrower without
any operating capital unless he could have secured alternative financing.67
In Shaughnessy, the lender had not required the borrower to deposit all
of his funds with the lender, thus distinguishing the present case from
K.M.C. Co. 68
Despite being able to distinguish its case from K.M.C. Co. and the
more onerous nature of calling a debtor's demand note, the Shaughnessy
court turned its attention to the question of whether the line of credit was
irrevocable.6 9 The Shaughnessy court acknowledged several definitions of

58. Id. at 950.
59. Id. at 949-50.
60. Id. at 950.
61. Id. at 951. The court said that "a demand note, on issue, ...

is due"
and noted that the contract made several references to a maturity or due date in
the future. Id. In addition, the court noted that the parties agreed in an extension
of the loan to modify it so that it became due in the future and that this modification
agreement did not mention the word "demand." Id. at 952.
62. Id. at 952. The document was silent as to the terms of the line of credit,
including whether the lender enjoyed a right to refuse disbursal. Id. at 953.
63. Id.at 953.
64. Id.(citing Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 48).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. In other words, was there a commitment to loan a certain amount?
Because the contract was silent as to this issue, the court had to look to definitions
and other factors. Id. at 954 n.9.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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line of credit made by other courts,7 0 but acquiesced to the following:

Line of credit signifies a limit of credit extended by bank to its customer,
to the full extent of which the customer may avail itself in its dealing
with the bank, but which the customer may not exceed. It most frequently

covers a series of transactions, in which case, when the customer's line
of credit is nearly exhausted or not replenished, the customer is expected
to reduce its7indebtedness by payments to the bank before making additional
use thereof. '

A line of credit "contemplates irrevocability because its speaks of a
limit 'to the full extent of which the customer may avail itself.' ' '72 The
court held that the lender had entered into a commitment which established
an irrevocable line of credit for the borrower.7 3 Thus, the lender was
obligated to fund the borrower, unless the borrower defaulted.7 4 The court
added:
[Y]our holding does not mean that banks will be compelled to throw good
money after bad. If the debtor defaults, the relationship can be ended.
Nor does this mean the bank will be forced to make the all or nothing
decision of lending or foreclosing if the borrower is defaulting. So long
as there is a default, the lender can make the note due and payable and
then extend payments .... Indeed, a bank can expressly
inform its
5
borrower that the arrangement is revocable or irrevocable.

70. Id. at 953. For example, in Midatlantic National Bank v. Commonwealth
Gen. Ltd., 386 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), the court said:
A line of credit is a limit of credit to cover a series of transactions ....
It does not impart upon the bank the legal responsibility to loan up to
the limit or a responsibility of the lender to borrow up to the limit, but
merely facilitates the easier extension of credit. Accordingly, if information
later comes to light which reflects upon the borrower's ability to satisfy
his debts, a bank need not fund the entire line of credit.
71. 715 S.W.2d at 954 (quoting Modoc Meat & Cattle Co. v. First State
Bank of Oregon, 271 Or. 276, 284-85, 532 P.2d 21, 25 (1975)) (emphasis added).
72. Id. (quoting Modoc, 271 Or. at 284, 532 P.2d at 25).
73. Id. The court also noted that the lender had charged the borrower a
one percent commitment fee when it established the loan agreement and that the
agreement contained an expiration date. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also Commercial Cotton, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985); Weinberg v. Farmers State Bank, 752
P.2d 719 (Mont. 1988). See generally Comment, supra note 42, at 1186, wherein
the author noted the problem unique to line of credit loans:
The line of credit is a transaction of convenience. The lender preapproves
the borrower for a certain number of dollars in credit, and gives him an
account, or line, upon which he can draw. The borrower then takes
advantage of an expedited process for getting a loan, submitting a request
for an advance on the line rather than a new loan application. The lender
normally requires the borrower to submit periodic financial reports in
order to monitor the borrower's financial condition. However, this ar-

rangement presents a difficult situation when a financially troubled borrower
begins to depend on advances from the credit line. The borrower's only
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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What lessons can lenders learn from K.M.C. Co. and Shaughnessy?
First, the lender should clearly specify that a loan instrument is payable
on demand, and not a line of credit. 76 Second, if the loan is a line of
credit, there may exist a duty to act in good faith in administering the
funds. This especially holds true when refusal to disburse funds devoids
the borrower of operating capital. 77 The lender may have to provide adequate
notice to the borrower before refusing to advance funds so the borrower
may secure alternative financing. 78 Third, barring default or fear of losing
its security interest in the collateral, the lender should continue extending
79
line of credit payments until the borrower reaches the designated level.
3. Waiver and Estoppel
Practically speaking, lenders often accept late payments from borrowers
for various reasons. Borrowers subsequently charge that the lender's consistent acceptance of late payment lull them into a false sense of security.
When the borrower can demonstrate consistently accepted late payments,
some courts will find that the lender waives the right to insist upon timely

payments in the future.80 The lender's decision to refuse late payments
should be provided in written notice to the borrower. 8'
Courts have also applied the equitable theory of estoppe8 2 to prevent
lenders from exercising their contractual rights to accelerate loan payments.

hope of resuscitation may be an influx of cash, which is precisely the
function of the credit line. Yet the lender is quite naturally concerned
with throwing good money after bad.
76. 715 S.W.2d at 952. The factors the Shaughnessy court noted in finding
that the loan instrument was not a demand note included: (1) language specifying
that the interest rate changes after the note becomes "due and payable;" (2) the
instrument listed eight events constituting default, the happening of which causes
the obligation to become due and payable regardless of the maturity date (the
court noting that a demand instrument is due when issued); (3) borrower's agreement
that failure to pay at maturity constituted default; and (4) that the promissory
note was extended through modification, and nowhere in the modification were
the words "on demand" to be found. Id.
77. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 759.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir.
1981); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 292 (Alaska 1983); Nevada Nat'l
Bank v. Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 513, 582 P.2d 364, 369 (1978); Knittel v. Security
State Bank, 593 P.2d 92, 95-96 (Okla. 1979); Lee v. Wood Prod. Credit Union,
275 Or. 445, 448, 551 P.2d 446, 448 (1976). See generally Bahls, supra note 8, at
222-23.
81. Bahls, supra note 8, at 222.
82. The elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise; (2) on which
the plaintiff relies to his detriment; and (3) wherein the injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. Mark Twain Plaza Bank v. Lowell H. Listrom
& Co., 714 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Knittel v. Security State Bank

3

held

that a statement made by the lender's officer, assuring the debtor that the
lender would not consider a late payment a default, precluded the lender
84
from accelerating the loan based on the default.
B.

Various Tort Theories

Plaintiffs generally try to recover against lenders under tort theories,
rather than under contract theories. One reason is that the contract itself
often limits recovery. For example, the contract might provide for liquidated
damages, beyond which the plaintiff is unable to recover. A plaintiff's
recovery in an action sounding in tort is not limited to contractual constraints. A plaintiff may also sue under a tort theory to recover damages
that she would be unable to recover under contract law. Under contract
law, damages put the plaintiff in the position she would have been in had
the breach not occurred. 85 Under tort theory, damages compensate the
plaintiff for injuries "proximately caused. ' 8 6 Perhaps the most important
87
reason plaintiffs prefer the tort approach is to recover punitive damages.
Punitive damages punish bad behavior and seek to deter similar conduct
inthe future.88 Thus, if a plaintiff recovers punitive damages, in essence
he is recovering damages not directly attributable to his losses. Some
detractors characterize punitive damages as a windfall for the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, under current tort law, when the defendant's conduct allows
it,"
the law allows the plaintiff to recover punitive damages.
One author suggests that tort actions are not appropriate in commercial
loan cases, but may be appropriate for breaches of consumer loan contracts:
Where the relationship between the parties is commercial in nature, recovery
for economic loss should be limited to contract.... In the commercial
setting, losses suffered because of negligent breach of contract, including
consequential damages, are insurable. Moreover, where the parties are

customarily of comparatively equal bargaining power, contract law provides
sufficient protection. This is not necessarily true in a consumer situation.
First, consumers typically cannot insure themselves against losses that might
result from negligence .... Second, the parties do not have equal bargaining

power. A consumer applicant is given few rights of negotiation with the
lender. For this reason, the consumer's recourse should not be limited to
the agreement between the parties2.

83. 593 P.2d 92, 95 (Okla. 1979).
84. Id.at 96.
85. J. CAmAm & J. PERRILo, THE

LAw OF CONTRACTS § 14-4, at 59 (1987).
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 110, at 766-70 (1984) [hereinafter PRossER].

86.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. § 2, at 11-15.
Id. § 2, at 9.
Id. § 2, at 14.
Ellis & Gray, Lender Liability for Negligently Processing Loan Appli-

cations, 92 DICK. L. Rnv. 363, 387 (1988).
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The following text surveys the application of various tort theories in
lender liability cases. The reader should ask whether limiting recovery to
contractual remedies would have been appropriate, or whether there is a
need for tort recovery. In the following cases, focus upon the role of the
lender and the relative bargaining strength between the lender and borrower.
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
The tort theory most often alleged against lenders is fraudulent misrepresentation. In Missouri, the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation
include: (1) a false, material misrepresentation; (2) the speaker's knowledge
of its falsity or his ignorance of its truth; (3) the speaker's intent that the
hearer act upon the misrepresentation in a manner reasonably contemplated;
(4) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; the hearer's
reliance on its truth, and the right to rely thereon; and (6) proximate
91
injury.
A case illustrative of the issues present under a fraudulent misrepresentation theory is Kruse v. Bank of America.92 In Kruse, the California
Court of Appeals reversed a jury's verdict for $47 million dollars in both
compensatory and punitive damages.9 3 In Kruse, an individual (Kruse) filed
suit against dpple growers and a bank alleging that the lender fraudulently
induced her into transferring her stock in the apple processor based on
the promise of long-term financing.9 4 The apple growers (Jewells) filed
cross-complaints against the bank, basically claiming three things: (i) the
bank had fraudulently failed to disclose certain information and in doing
so, wrongfully induced the Jewells to borrow beyond their means; (ii) once
hopelessly overextended, the bank reneged on its promise to provide longterm financing, and (iii) that the bank failed to apply sale proceeds to
debts owed to other creditors as it had promised to do. 95 The court first
addressed the Jewells' complaint.

91. Gast v. Ebert, 739 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (action to rescind
a release agreement with defendant's insurer). The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs
§ 526 (1977) sets forth the following elements for fraudulent misrepresentation: (1)
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law; (2) made when the maker
knows it is false or does not have confidence in its accuracy; (3) for the purpose
of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it; (4) who
justifiably relies on the misrepresentation and is thereby damaged.
92. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988).
93. Id. at __,
248 Cal. Rptr. at 235. After a three-month trial, the jury

returned a verdict against the lender, awarding $20,020,000 in compensatory damages
and $27,675,000 in punitive damages. The trial court granted the lender's motion

for a new trial conditioned on plaintiff's and cross-complainant's acceptance of a
remittitur to $6 million in punitive damages. Id. at -,
248 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
94. Id. at
, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
95. Id. at
, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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First, the Jewells alleged that the bank "fraudulently induced them to
undertake the short-term borrowing without disclosing the possibility that
their request for long-term financing would be denied." 96 As to this claim,
the court held that the record failed to establish justifiable reliance. 9 7
As to the Jewells' claim that the bank failed to apply sale proceeds
as promised, the court held that the plaintiffs had not proved causation.
The court said:
Even if Bunch's, the local branch manager, promise [was] false and
fraudulent, the property loss sustained by the Jewells was not the product
of Bunch's false promise but was the direct result of their self-created
indebtedness. Put differently, even had they not assigned the trust deeds,
their property would still have been subject to the satisfaction of the

existing claims of their creditors.' 8

The court then addressed the Kruse complaint. Mrs. Kruse alleged that
the bank misrepresented to her that long-term financing would be forthcoming, and in doing so fraudulently induced her to transfer her controlling
stock interest in a corporation to the Jewell family.99 After transferring

her controlling stock, Mrs. Kruse was unable to obtain a long-term loan
from another lender. 100 The court noted that this "argument fails under
its own weight, the record reflecting an absence of any substantial evidence
supporting either an implied promise to lend money or the essential requirement of justifiable reliance."''
a. Misrepresentation of Intention to Renew Note or Extend Additional
Credit
In Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America,'02 the Supreme Court of California upheld an award of one million dollars in compensatory damages
and one million dollars in punitive damages against a commercial lender.
The punitive damages award was based in part on a claim that the lender
misrepresented its intent to extend long-term financing. 03 The court noted:
"[A]Ithough the [B]ank had determined not to extend further loans to
Cormac, the loan officers indicated that future financing might be forthcoming only after the assignment. One day after the accounts receivable
...were assigned to the Bank, the long term loan application was turned

248 Cal. Rptr. at 226.

96. Id. at

Cal. Rptr. at 226.
248 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
99. Id. at
100. Id. at __, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
248 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
101. Id. at
102. 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1985) (en banc).
103. Id. at 892, 701 P.2d at 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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down." 104 Finding that the evidence supported the verdict, the court upheld
the jury's determination.' 05
In Stirling v. Chemical Bank,106 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a cause of action for fraud existed where a bank failed to fulfill
its promise not to call outstanding loans. The court also relied upon the
bank's failure to make additional loans to plaintiff in return for the
resignation of certain corporate officers and directors of the plaintiff.1 7
The Sanchez-Corea and Stirling cases serve as a warning to lenders to not
make promises that they do not intend to keep.
Despite the above cases, where the loan agreement provides that the
decision whether to extend additional credit is within the lender's sole
discretion, fraudulent misrepresentation is harder to prove. For example,
in In re Belco, Inc.,108 the borrowers asserted that the lender had fraudulently
misrepresented its intent to lend.I 9 The borrowers insisted they had dismissed
a pending Chapter 11 action and sold certain interests in order to pay the
proceeds to the bank. These actions were in reliance on the bank's representation that it would extend a line of credit."l0 The bankruptcy court
held that the failure to extend a line of credit did not constitute actionable
fraud since the agreement provided that the lender had total discretion as
to whether it would make additional loans."' The Belco court's implicit
rationale was that the bank's discretionary lending clause in the loan
agreement prevented the borrowers from claiming reliance, a material element of fraudulent misrepresentation. Though such language would provide
some evidence of reliance, it should not be dispositive-certanly the lender
may have made oral representations to the borrower following the execution
of the loan agreement upon which the borrowers might have relied.
b. Misrepresentationfor Failure to Disclose Material
Information to Borrower
Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distributors, Inc. 112 represents the
most significant lender liability case in Missouri. Guarantors of a note
alleged that the lender had fraudulently misrepresented the classification
of the loan by failing to disclose that the lender had classified the note
as a problem loan." 3 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 909, 701 P.2d at 838, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
Id. at 892, 701 P.2d at 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
382 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1158.
38 Bankr. 525 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984).

109. Id. at 528-29.
110. Id.
111. Id.

112. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
113. Id. at 52-53.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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District held that no confidential or fiduciary relationship exists, between
114
a bank and its customer who borrows funds, for fraudulent nondisclosure.
Similarly, the court reasoned that no confidential or fiduciary relationship
exists between the bank and the guarantors of a note. The defendant bank,
thus, was under no duty to disclose to the guarantors of a note that their
note was classified as a problem note.1 1 5 The Centerre court placed a great
amount of emphasis on the fact that the guarantor had managed the debtor
business prior to its agreement to act as guarantor.11 6 The court reasoned
that the guarantor could not have looked to the bank for information on
the business' financial well-being and thus the bank did not owe him a
117
fiduciary duty.
As the Centerre case demonstrates, a lender generally does not have

an affirmative duty to disclose material information to a borrower. Nevertheless, parties sometimes have an "obligation to speak rather than remain
silent, when a failure to speak is the equivalent of fraudulent concealment.""18 This obligation arises "where one person is in position to have
and to exercise influence over another who reposes confidence in him
whether a fiduciary relationship in the strict sense of the term exists between
them or not." 1 19
In Barnett Bank v. Hooper,120 the borrower borrowed funds to invest
with an investment company after a bank officer assured the borrower
that the investment company was financially sound and had passed IRS
scrutiny.' 2' Despite this representation, the bank, in reality, was suspicious
that the investment company was involved in a check kiting scheme.'2 The
court held that in this instance the bank owed its customer a duty to
disclose and had breached this duty. 23 The court noted:
[Wihere a bank becomes involved in a transaction with a customer with
whom it has established a relationship of trust and confidence, and it is
a transaction from which the bank is likely to benefit at the customer's
expense, the bank may be found to have assumed a duty to disclose facts
material to the transaction, peculiarly
within its knowledge, and not oth124
erwise available to the customer.

114. Id. at 53.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Union Nat'l Bank v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 1986).
119. Id. (quoting Hanson Motor Co. v. Young, 223 Ark. 191, 265 S.W.2d
501 (1954)).
120. 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
121. Id. at 924.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 925-26.
124. Id. at 925. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa
1970); Denison State Bank v. Maderia, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982); Richfield
Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d 648 (1976); Deist v.
Wachholz, 208 Mont. 207, 678 P.2d 188 (1984).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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1. Constructive Fraud
Actual fraud exists where the plaintiff can prove that the defendant
knew his representations were false and intended to defraud the plaintiff.
In the absence of such intent or knowledge, plaintiffs claim that the lender's
representations were negligently made and constituted constructive fraud.,' 5
In order for constructive fraud to exist, a special relationship must exist
between the parties so that one relies, to its detriment, on the other. In
White v. Mulvania,126 a Missouri court said: "If ... a confidential relationship can be proved at trial, proof of actual fraud is unnecessary. It
is well established that the breach of a promise made during such a
relationship will be considered constructively fraudulent because of the
special reliance present."' 27
Constructive fraud is sometimes known as negligent misrepresentation.
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that negligent
misrepresentation occurs when "[o]ne who, in the course of his business,

profession, or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has
a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others
in their business transactions . . . fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.'1 28 One found
liable for negligent misrepresentation "[i]s subject to liability for pecuniary

125. In Union National Bank v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 886 (8th Cir.
1986) (quoting Miskimins v. City Nat'l Bank, 248 Ark. 1194, 1204, 456 S.W.2d
673, 679 (1970) (citations omitted)), the court noted that "[c]onstructive fraud arises
from 'a breach of a legal or equitable duty, which the law declares to be fraudulent
because of its tendency to deceive others, regardless of the moral guilt, purpose
or intent of the fraud feasor."'
126. 575 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (holding that testatrix had a right
to rely on counsel-executor's alleged promise).
127. Id.at 189.
128. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 552 (1976). Illustration 11 in comment
h sets forth the following example:
A Bank receives an inquiry from B Bank respecting the credit-worthiness
of C Corporation, a customer of A Bank. B Bank informs A Bank that
the reason for the inquiry is that D & Co., an advertising agency, has
been approached by C Corporation with a request that it manage a $200,000
advertising campaign for C Corporation on the local television station;
that under the terms of its customary arrangement with the television
station, D & Co. would be guarantor of any amount owing the station,
and that D & Co. has requested its bank to ascertain from C Corporation's
bank whether C Corporation is sufficiently credit-worthy to incur and
satisfy a liability of $200,000. A Bank, without checking C Corporation's
account, and without a disclaimer of liability for its answer, replies that
it believes C Corporation to be good for such an obligation. D & Co.
arranges for the advertising campaign and shortly thereafter C Corporation
enters bankruptcy. A Bank is subject to liability for negligence to D &
Co.
Id. comment h, illustration 11.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information."' 129
This theory is used both by borrowers alleging that lenders misled them
into borrowing and by lenders alleging that other lenders misled them into
loaning money.
For example, in Hill v. EquitableBank, 30 a group of investors brought
suit against a bank alleging that the bank had negligently misrepresented
the soundness of an investment scheme. Relying on Jacques v. FirstNational
Bank,' the court concluded that the bank owed the plaintiff a duty of
care and denied summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation
32
claim.1

In Union National Bank v. Farmers Bank,'33 a bank which purchased
a note claimed that another bank had committed constructive fraud by
failing to warn of a note maker's financial strength. 3 4 The court held that
constructive fraud was not applicable, because the plaintiff's reliance was
not justifiable.' The court noted that the plaintiff's officers were knowledgeable and experienced in purchasing such notes, but failed to seek out
36
available information as to the maker's financial strength.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Berkline Corp. v. Bank of

Mississippi, 3 7 held that a lender may incur liability where one of its bank
officers makes representations or omissions of material facts concerning
credit worthiness of one of its customers. 38 The court held that even when
the lender offers such information gratuitously, the lender must "use the

129. Id.
130. 655 F. Supp. 631, 649-51 (D. Del. 1987).
131. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
132. Id. at 650-51. After'discussing the public policy rationales (i.e., the nature
of the banking industry and its relation to public welfare), the court said:
This policy rationale is equally appropriate to finding a duty against
negligent misrepresentation under the facts of this case. Plaintiffs solicited
Rous' [defendant's agent] view of the Eagle investment, as well as financing
from the bank. Rous suggested that plaintiffs deposit money at the bank
while representing that plaintiffs would receive loans and that the investment
was sound. Whether or not he should have told plaintiffs more about the
bank's relationship to Eagle is a jury question. Based on the meeting and
the resulting deposits, a contractual relationship came to exist which required the bank to exercise due care in communicating facts to plaintiffs.
Id.; see also Danca v. Taunton Say. Bank, 385 Mass. 1, 429 N.E.2d 1129 (1982);
Banker's Trust Co. v. Steenburn, 95 Misc. 2d 967, 409 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978).
133. 786 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Barrett v. Bank of America, 183
Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rprt. 16 (1986). But see Citibank v. Plapinger, 66
N.Y.2d 90, 485 N.E.2d 974, 495 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1985).
134. 786 F.2d at 886.
135. Id. at 887.
136. Id.
137. 453 So. 2d 699 (Miss. 1984).
138. Id. at 702.
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skill and expertise which they hold themselves out to the public as possessing." 3 9
In Central States Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equipment Co., 140 the
lender was liable for failing to disclose that another defendant, Terminal
Equipment Company, had defaulted on two previous loans with it.14' The
plaintiff, Central States Stamping Co., was considering advancing Terminal
Equipment $50,000 to build a piece of machinery for the plaintiff. 42 Before
advancing such, plaintiff called Terminal Equipment's bank and inquired
about the financial strength of Terminal Equipment. 43 Mr. Martin, the
bank's officer, failed to disclose that Terminal Equipment was financially
unstable and was in default on two loans. 144 The court said:
[O]nce Martin undertook to advise [plaintiff] with respect to Terminal's
financial condition he had a duty to disclose information in his possession
which would reasonably be considered material to the decision he knew
[plaintiff] was in the process of making. Martin knew that [plaintiff] had
confidence in his knowledge about Terminal. His positive answers were
likely to induce [plaintiff] to accept Terminal's proposal. Failure to disclose
Terminal's true financial
position made his previous positive responses
4

misleading at least.' 1

Once a lender takes on the responsibility of providing information
courts are sometimes willing to find that a duty exists to use due care in
providing such information. This duty does not arise simply because someone inquires about this information. Instead, whether a duty arises is based
on the particular facts of the case.
In Vacinek v. FirstNationalBank, 46 private lenders brought suit against
a bank alleging that it had intentionally misrepresented debtor's financial
status. 147 The court held that the bank had no duty to disclose a mortgage
on debtor's property to private lenders who were considering making a
loan. 4 The court also noted that a fiduciary relationship did not exist
between the bank and the private lenders. Despite the long standing relationships between the private lenders and customers, the evidence failed
to show that the bank had superior knowledge unavailable to the private
lenders. Nor did the evidence illustrate that the bank knew the private
lenders were placing their trust and confidence in them. 149 Thus, the most

139. Id.
140. 727 F.2d -1405 (6th Cir. 1984).
141. Id. at 1409.
142. Id. at 1406-07.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1409.
146. 416 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
147. Id. at 797.
148. Id. at 799. The court noted that the private lenders never expressed their
specific intent to loan the debtor money. Id.
149. Id. at 799-80.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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important fact in determining whether a duty is owed to someone inquiring
about the borrower's financial stability is the amount of trust the inquiring
party places in the lender.
If the inquiring party is especially skilled in these matters, and the
information is available through other sources, a bank probably will not
be liable for misrepresentation. The court's holding in Vacinek demonstrates
the fact that the lender must owe a duty to the plaintiff before the courts
will hold the lender liable for either fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. 5 0
2.

Economic Duress

Under the theory of economic duress, plaintiffs are required to prove
the following elements: (1) a threat to do some act which the threatening
party has no legal right to do; (2) some illegal exaction, fraud, or deception;
(3) a restraint that is imminent and destroys free agency without present
means of protection; and (4) the threatening party is responsible for the
claimant's financial distress. 5 '

The leading economic duress case is State National Bank v. Farah
Manufacturing Co. 1 52 In Farah, the bank warned the corporate shareholders
that it would consider the election of Farah to the board of directors as
a default.' 53 Since the contract itself provided for acceleration upon default,'5 4 the bank's warning amounted to a threat of accelerating the loan
if the corporate shareholders chose Farah instead of the person it had

designated for the position.

The corporation sued the lender alleging that the lender had committed

economic duress.' 55 The jury awarded the plaintiff $18.9 million. 5 6 The
Texas Court of Appeals upheld the jury verdict, 57 finding that the lender's

150. No such duty exists in Missouri based solely on the relationship between
lender and borrower. The lender-borrower relationship is characterized as creditordebtor and is not a fiduciary relationship. Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705
S.W.2d 42, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). Only where there is a confidential or fiduciary
relationship between borrower and lender will the court impose on the latter a
duty to disclose material facts. Id.
151. First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 185-86
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982); see also Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 80 N.M.
680, 459 P.2d 842 (1969) (threat by mortgage lender not to provide financing
together with its refusal to release its financing commitment to another lender
unless borrower agreed to pay settlement costs of $12,000, even though no actual
dispute existed, constituted duress amounting to business or economic compulsibn).
152. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
153. Id.at 672.
154. Id.at 673.
155. Id.at 683.
156. Id.at 667.
157. Id. at 699. The court actually reformed the verdict, granting remittitur
of $300,000, which reduced the award to $18.6 million. Id.
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improper threat to exercise a default provision, when it had no intention
of doing so, was actionable duress.' 58 "Acceleration clauses are not to be
used offensively such as for the commercial advantage of the creditor.
They do not permit acceleration when the facts make its use unjust or
oppressive."' 59
The Farah court based its holding in part on section 1.208 of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. The Farahcourt concluded that section
1.208 provides that the lender's proposal to accelerate must stem "[f]rom
1
a reasonablegood faith belief that its security was about to be impaired."'"
Finding that the lender did not believe that its security was impaired, the
6
court found that the lender had committed actionable fraud. '
Although the Farah decision shocked the banking industry, its implications are not without limits. It is important to learn from the Farah
decision the lengths to which courts will allow lenders to go in exercising
control over their debtors. First, lenders should never threaten to take any
adverse action as a means to coerce certain action by the borrowers. For
example, banks should never threaten to accelerate existing loans if a farmer
plants beans instead of corn. Similarly, a lender should not threaten acceleration to coerce the appointment of one of the bank's officers to the
borrower's board of directors. Nevertheless, the bank may lawfully accelerate a loan when: (1) it is specifically permitted in the contract; 162 or, (2)
the bank's security interest in the collateral securing the loan is jeopardized. 163 A lender's acceleration of a debtor's loan for reasons other than
those stated above runs the risk of being held liable for fraud under the
Farah rationale. Certainly, the lender should not make acceleration contingent upon certain actions. The courts would treat this as a threat under
the Farah standard. 164
3.

Tortious Interference with Contract

Plaintiffs often allege that, by failing to extend credit or by cutting
off a line of credit, the lender has tortiously interfered with the borrower's
right to contract with a third party. The typical case arises when the
borrower agrees to purchase machinery or other assets, after assurances

158. Id. at 686.
159. Id. at 685.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 688.
162. Id. at 684-86. Despite the holding in Farah, it would appear that where
the contract specifically provides for acceleration, the lender may do so without
risk. For criticism of the Farah rationale, see Bahls, supra note 8, at 240-41 and
Note, supra note 7, at 732-37.
163. 678 S.W.2d at 684-85.
164. See generally Flick & Replansky, Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers:
Pitfalls and Protections, 103 BAN.INO L.J. 220, 238 (1986).
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from the bank that it will lend the necessary capital, only to find that the
lender is unwilling to lend. Sometimes this mistaken belief is based in part
on the lender's previous actions. The borrower often sues the lender for
tortious interference with the borrower's contractual relationship. This interference results in the borrower's loss of business opportunity. Under
certain circumstances, courts have held a lender liable for tortious interference, even where the contractual relation is merely prospective. 165 Even
though there are no reported Missouri cases, Missouri does recognize this
cause of action.'6 The most troublesome element for borrowers to prove
67
is that the lender intended to cause the breach of contract.1
In most lender liability cases, defendants will raise the defense that it

was either protecting or pursuing a legitimate business interest. For example,
in Del State Bank v. Salmon 16 the court held that a lender was not liable
for tortious interference with contract when it intentionally interfered with
the employment contract of a corporate president. The lender's means were
fair and accompanied by an honest intent to better its own financial
position.169

165. Peterson v. First Nat'l Bank, 392 N.W.2d 158, 165-66 (Iowa Ct. App.
1986).
166. See Tri-Continental Leasing Co. v. Arthur F.G. Neidhardt, 540 S.W.2d
210, 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Section 23.11 of the Missouri Approved instruction
provides:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, a contract existed between plaintiff and (third party) which was
[breached] [terminated] by [third party], and
Second, defendant caused [third party] to [breach] [terminate] his contract
with plaintiff, and
Third, defendant did so intentionally and without justification or excuse,
and
Fourth, plaintiff was thereby damaged.
MAI 23.11 (3rd ed. 1981).
The Notes on Use point out that "[t]he term 'third party' means the one with
whom plaintiff had a contract and the one who, at defendant's request, breached
or terminated the contract." Id.
167. In Francisco v. Kansas City Star Co., 629 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981), plaintiffs claimed tortious interference with contract. The Missouri Court
of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for
a mistrial because the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant's actions were
done with an intent to cause a breach of contract or done without justification.
Id. at 535; see also Dobbs, Tortious Interference with ContractualRelationships,
34 AnK. L. REv. 335 (1981).
168. 548 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1976).
169. Id. at 1027. The court said:
Evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding the bank's acts were designed
to benefit the bank. Those acts could be found to be strong, aggressive,
and intentionally made to protect the bank. Its economic power was used
to influence Amerand's board to terminate Salmon's employment. The
bank's primary object was to better its financial position as to the Amerand
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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In Jack L. Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Co.,170 the buyer of
fabric brought a tortious interference suit against a lender who had a
factoring agreement with the seller.'17 The borrower alleged that, by declining
to extend further credit, the lender tortiously interfered with the contractual
relationship between buyer and seller. 172 The court noted that the lender
had no obligation to extend further credit and that the lender was justified
in demanding payments on the outstanding invoices before extending further
credit.

7

1

4.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm

The intentional infliction of emotional harm is becoming a much more
prevalent cause of action in lender liability suits. The elements for this
cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) done intentionally or recklessly, with knowledge or deliberate disregard that emotional
74
distress will follow; (3) which causes severe emotional distress.
In Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America, 75 plaintiffs claimed that actions
by the bank's employees were designed to inflict emotional distress. 7 6 The
court found there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict,
77
and upheld the emotional distress claim.

loans. The primary object was not to wrongfully harm Salmon, though
the acts were to his detriment. One need not agree with the bank's actions,
but it exercised a privilege to lawfully interfere.
Id.
170. 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 364 N.E.2d 1119, 396 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1977).
171. Id. at 1080, 364 N.E.2d at 1120, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 348. The factoring
agreement provided that the lender would guarantee the payment of accounts
receivable owed by purchasers whom it deemed credit-worthy. Id. at 1079, 364
N.E.2d at 1119, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
172. Id. at 1080, 364 N.E.2d at 1120, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
173. Id. at 1080, 364 N.E.2d at 1120, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 348-49. The court
held that the seller did not breach its contract with the buyer, thus the buyer could
not maintain a tortious interference claim against the lender. Id. at 1080, 364
N.B.2d at 1120, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
174. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
175. 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1985).
176. Id. at 897, 701 P.2d at 829-30, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
177. Id. at 908, 701 P.2d at 837, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91. The court noted:
[Tihere was extensive testimony about an incident at the San Franciscan
Hotel in San Francisco. According to the testimony, Bank officials publicly
ridiculed [the plaintiffs], using profanity in their statements. A friend who
was with the [plaintiffs] testified that Bank employees were ...

laughing

about the financial plight of Cormac. In response to all these instances,
[the plaintiffs] testified as to resulting problems of alcoholism, severe
headaches, insomnia, tension and anxiety.
Id. at 909, 701 P.2d at 838, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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In Morse v. Mutual FederalSavings & Loan Association,78 the mortgage
lender's wrongful acts [wrongful advertisement] in attempting foreclosure
was a willful misuse of its power of sale. 179 The court further viewed these
wrongful acts as humiliating and distressful to the borrowers. The mortgage
lender's action, therefore, allowed recovery for "mental damages," which
included mental suffering, defamation, and loss of reputation. 80
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Medlock v. Farmers State Bank,'
held that a borrower/wife was not entitled to recover for emotional distress
resulting from the bank's failure to obtain credit life insurance on the
borrower/husband. The court did not find a sufficient showing of malice,
18 2
willfulness, wantonness or inhuman behavior.

5. Defamation
Defamation is one lender liability theory which has great ramifications
for the smallest of lenders and those who sell consumer goods on credit.
In Alaska Statebank v. Fairco,83 a bank's wrongful repossession of collateral
effectively "publicized" a false statement that the borrower had unjustifiably
failed to pay its debts. The Supreme Court of Alaska construed this
publication as defamatory in nature. 184 "Statebank's act of closing Clowntown (the plaintiff's business which served as collateral for the loan) was
suggestive of Fairco's failure to honor financial obligations, constituting
a (statement) that spread throughout the business community and impaired
[plaintiff's] relationship with customers, clients, employees, business as85
sociates and suppliers."'
In Reese v. First Missouri Bank & Trust,'86 the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that no cause of action exists for attempted wrongful foreclosure." 7 The mortgagors had brought suit seeking, among other things,
recovery for damages done to their reputations. 8 8 Finding that no cause
of action existed for attempted wrongful foreclosure, the court declined to
address a defamation cause of action. 89 Thus, a Missouri plaintiff must

178. 536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982).
179. Id.at 1280.
180. Id.
181. 696 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
182. Id. at 879. The plaintiff alleged that she should recover emotional damages
from an attempted wrongful foreclosure. Id. at 876. The Missouri Supreme Court
has since held that no cause of action exists for wrongful foreclosure. See Reese
v. First Mo. Bank & Trust, 736 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (en banc).
183. 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
184. Id.at 294-95.

185. Id.at 295.
186.
187.
188.
189.

736 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
Id.at 373.
Id.at 372.
Id.at 373.
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establish the lender's actions as wrongful for reasons other than an attempted
wrongful foreclosure in order to prevail under a defamation theory in
lender liability.
6. Prima Facia Tort
A "prima facia tort" is a wrong that is not covered by a traditional
19 the bank
tort liability. For example, in Boatmen's Bank v. Berwald,1
brought an action to recover on a promissory note and the makers counterclaimed for prima facia tort. The court listed the following elements of
prima facia tort: (1) an intentional lawful act of the defendant; (2) done
with an intent to cause injury to the plaintiff; (3) which causes injury to
the plaintiff; and (4) an absence of any justification (or an insufficient
justification) for defendant's act. 191 Thus, a prima facia tort exists where
the act itself is legal, but the intent is to injure. The Berwald court held
that the borrowers had not made out a cause of action for prima facia
tort. The borrowers failed to establish that the bank had an intent to
injure. 1' Like other lender liability tort theories, the lender's intent to
injure is the most difficult obstacle to overcome.
7.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The relationship between lender and borrower is generally that of
creditor-debtor. 93 Absent any special relationship, the parties do not owe
the other any sort of fiduciary duty. 94 A plaintiff-borrower must show
that some sort of special relationship existed in order to prevail under a
breach of fiduciary duty theory. Creativity is needed and discovery will be
of the utmost importance if the plaintiff is to prevail under this cause of
action. In the following cases, courts have addressed the type of relationships
that give rise to a fiduciary duty.
In Pigg v. Robertson,19 - the borrower, Mr. Pigg, went to his bank to
borrow money to buy a farm. 196 The usual loan officer was not there, but97
the secretary told him he could talk to Mr. Robertson, the defendant.
Mr. Pigg, believing Mr. Robertson to be a loan officer, told Mr. Robertson

190. 752 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
191. Id. at 833 (citing Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980)).
192. Id. at 834. See generally Missouri Court Overturns $150,000 PrimaFacie
Tort Lender Liability Jury Verdict, 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 756 (May 2, 1988).
193. Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
194. Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 712 (N.D. 1989).
195. 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
196. Id. at 598.
197. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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of his intent to buy the farm. 198 When Mr. Pigg attempted to buy the
farm, he learned that the defendant had already purchased it. 19 The
defendant was not an employee of the bank, but rather a vice-president

of an investment company.2w The plaintiff brought suit, contending that
Robertson's presence in the bank placed him in a position of trust. Robertson, therefore, was under a duty to divulge any material information
and should not personally profit from information gained during the conversation. 20' The defendant claimed that he had already learned of the farm
and was interested in purchasing it prior to his conversation with Mr.
Pigg.2°2
The court held that although the relationship between bank and depositor is generally creditor-debtor, the relation may give rise to some
particular obligation2 3 . These obligations included the duty not to disclose
matters relating to customer's business without his consent and the duty
to disclose to the depositor any material information concerning the conversation. 2°4 The court found sufficient evidence to establish a confidential
relationship and that Mr. Robertson had a duty to disclose his interest in
25
the farm to Mr. Pigg.
In Production Credit Association v. Croft,206 the lender brought suit
against the borrowers to foreclose on real estate mortgages and security
agreements. The borrowers counterclaimed, alleging negligence, 20 7 breach
of fiduciary duty, and failure to disclose. Concerning the breach of fiduciary
relationship, the Wisconsin court noted that two types of fiduciary relationships generally exist: "(1) those specifically created by contract or a
formal legal relationship ... and (2) those implied in law due to the
factual situation surrounding the transactions and relationships of the parties

198. Id.at 599.
199. Id.The defendant sold the farm seven months later for a $45,000 profit.
Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.at 600 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 601. The court noted:
[R]espondent acknowledged that, during [the bank president's] absence,
bank employees asked him questions posed to them by customers and
relayed respondent's replies to customers. Thus, respondent was aware that
he was being called upon to provide advice for customers and a jury
would have been entitled to find that a bank customer approaching respondent, under the circumstances in which appellant did so, had a right
to expect that his disclosures would be given the same protection they
would have received had they been made to a regular bank officer ....

Id.
206. 423 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
207. See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
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to each other and to the questioned transactions."
the court further explained:

20

As to the former,

Lenders, under certain circumstances, require borrowers to comply with
loan covenants restricting the operation of the borrower's business ....
These covenants often include promises to ... obtain lender approval of
certain transactions. These covenants may serve to keep a "lease" on the
operations of the borrower. Arrangements such as these should not give
rise to the creation of a fiduciary duty so long as the lender's restraints
are reasonably necessary to protect its interest in the collateral and are
made in good faith.2
The court reasoned that the loan provisions in question were to protect
the lender's security interest and did not breach a fiduciary relationship
210
created by the contract.
The court next inquired into whether the facts surrounding the loan
gave rise to a fiduciary relationship. The court noted:
A fiduciary relationship between a lender and borrower may be established
when a borrower demonstrates that a lender acted as financial advisor to
a subservient borrower and the borrower relied on the lender's advice.
Factors a court considers when determining whether borrowers are subservient generally include the borrower's age, mental capacity, health,
education and degree of business experience. The courts also focus on the
degree to which the subservient party entrusted
his or her affairs to the
211
lender and reposed confidence in the lender.
The lender's financial advice and encouragement in Production Credit
212
did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship between it and the borrowers.
8.

Negligent Processing of Loan Renewal Application

In Jacques v. First National Bank,2 3 a Maryland court held that a
bank which agreed to process a loan application owed the customer a duty
214
of reasonable care in the processing and determination of that application.
The borrowers in Jacques entered into a contract to purchase a home for
$142,000.25 The borrowers submitted a loan application and a $144 fee

208. Production Credit, 423 N.W.2d at 546 (citing Denison State Bank v.
Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 691, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (1982)).
209. Id. at 546-47 (citing Bahls, supra note 8, at 233).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 547 (citing Bahls, supra note 8, at 231-32).
212. Id. at 548; see also Mantooth v. Federal Land Bank, 528 N.E.2d 1132
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Shiplet v. First Sec. Bank of Livingston, Inc., 762 P.2d 242
(Mont. 1988); Citizens State Bank v. Hahn, 146 Wis. 2d 865, 431 N.W.2d 327
(Ct. App. 1988) (not published in official reports).
213. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986).
214. Id. at 540-45, 515 A.2d at 762-65.
215. Id. at 528, 515 A.2d at 756. The contract provided for a down payment
of $30,000 and was contingent upon obtaining financing for the balance ($112,000)
at a rate of no more than 12 1/4% interest. Id. at 528-29, 515 A.2d at 756-57.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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to cover the costs of the appraisal and credit report. 2 16 The interest rate
21 7
offered by the lender at the time of the application was 11-7/8 percent.
After processing, a loan officer informed the borrowers that they qualified
for a loan of $74,000.218 The lender later informed the borrowers that it
had erred, and that under the lender's guidelines, the borrowers qualified
for no more than $41,400.219

The borrowers immediately began to look for additional financing. 20
Because interest rates had risen, the most competitive rate available was
13-7/8 percent on $100,000 for thirty years from a competing lender.? 1
The borrowers determined that the loan at 13-7/8 percent would cost them
an additional $50,000 over the life of the loan. The borrower subsequently
accepted the loan of $41,400 from the defendant at 11-7/8 percent and
secured an additional loan from the defendant of $50,000 at 15 percent
interest rate to cover the rest of the purchase price. 2m
The borrowers later filed suit, alleging malicious interference with
contract, gross negligence, and negligence. 22 The jury found the lender not
liable on the malicious interference and gross negligence counts, but awarded
the borrowers $10,000 compensatory damages on the negligence count.?
The Court of Special Appeals held that the lender owed no duty to the
borrowers to use due care in processing the loan application. 2 The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that a mortgage lender has a duty to exercise
reasonable care in processing a loan application and in determining loan
eligibility. 2 6
The court first determined that the borrowers could have properly
asserted a claim for breach of contract because the mortgage loan application
did create a contract. 227 The court then said, "implicit in the undertaking

216. Id. at 529, 515 A.2d at 757.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. To secure this additional $50,000 personal loan, the lender required
the borrowers to pledge their personal stock portfolio as security. Id.
223. Id. at 530-31, 515 A.2d at 757.
224. Id. at 531, 515 A.2d at 758.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 527, 515 A.2d at 756.
227. Id. at 537, 515 A.2d at 761. The court noted that the lender expressly
agreed to process the loan application and "lock in" the 11 7/8% interest rate.

Id. The lender argued that there was no consideration, the $144 being an out-ofpocket expense. Id. The court determined that the contract was supported by two
kinds of consideration, the $144 application fee and the fact that the lender obtained
a business advantage and potential benefit because after paying the fee, the borrowers
in effect removed themselves from the market. Id. at 537-38, 515 A.2d at 761.

As to the lender's assertion that the fee was an out-of-pocket expense, the court
noted that consideration is valid even if paid to a third-person. Id. at 537, 515

A.2d at 761.
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of the Bank to process the loan application is the agreement to do so with
reasonable care.''228 The court then examined whether the creation of the
229
contract created a concomitant duty under the existing circumstances.
The court said that where there is pure economic loss, a duty of care will
not be recognized unless an "intimate nexus" exists.1 0 The Jacques court
determined that such a relationship existed, citing (i) the extraordinary
financing provisions between the parties,2 3' and (ii) the fact that the banking
32
industry is a business affected with a public interest.
First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Caudle323 also involved
an allegation of negligence in processing a loan application. 2 4 In Caudle,
the borrowers approached the lenders to inquire about a home loan. 251 The
borrowers learned that they could not afford the loan payments of the
conventional loan because of the high interest rates.2 6 The parties then
discussed the possibility of qualifying for an FHA 235 loan. 2 7 The lender
agreed to process the necessary papers to see if the borrowers qualified
for such a loan. 2 8 Several months later, a bank officer informed both the
borrowers and their contractor that the loan was approved, and shortly
thereafter construction began on their home. 239
When the house was nearly complete, the borrowers learned for the
first time that their FHA loan had not been approved.m After the home

228. Id. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759.
231. Id. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762. The court noted that the "rather extraordinary
financing provisions contained in the real estate sales contract, and thereby integrated
into the loan application, left the Jacques particularly vulnerable and dependent
upon the Bank's exercise of due care." Id.
232. Id. at 541, 515 A.2d at 763. The court quoted an Oklahoma Court of
Appeals decision, saying:
Banks exist and operate almost solely by using public funds and are
invested with enormous public trust. Their financial power within the
community amounts to a virtual financial monoploy [sic] in the field of
money lending. The legislature has carefully defined their corporate charge
within finite limits in direct proportion to their power.
Id. at 542, 515 A.2d at 763 (quoting Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 646 P.2d 616, 619 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982)).
233. 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1982).
234. Id. at 1052.
235. Id. at 1050.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1051. "A[n FHA] 235 loan allows low income borrowers who
qualify to have a portion of the interest on their home construction loan subsidized
by the federal government." Id. at 1051.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. The court noted that the lender first stated the reason the loan had
not been approved was the fact that the borrowers had purchased a new car. Later,
the lenders were told they had not qualified because the husband's income was
too high. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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was completed and had received a final inspection, the contractor was
informed that the borrowers' loan had not been approved241 The borrowers
then obtained a 30-year Veteran's Administration (VA) loan, at 14 1/2
percent interest, to pay the contractor.2 42 This new loan resulted in monthly
payments of $436. 10.243 Evidence produced at trial indicated that the FHA
financing would have resulted in monthly payments of $197.24
A jury awarded the borrowers $22,500.245 The issue on appeal was
"whether a statement made by a lender's agent to prospective home buyers
that they had been approved for an FHA 235 loan, when they, in fact,
had not been approved, is actionable ... ."2 The court held that even
though the lender "was under no duty to help procure a federally subsidized
loan ... once it voluntarily agreed to assist [the borrowers], it was required
to act with due care." 2 7

In High v. McLean Financial Corp.,248 plaintiffs claimed that the
defendant's agents "constantly assured" plaintiffs that the lender had
approved their loan application. A third party later notified them in writing

that the bank had denied their application 49 The loan applicants brought
suit against the lender alleging breach of contract, violation of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, fraud and
of fiduciary duty, and negligence. 2 0
under District of Columbia law, the
applicants where the lender accepted

intentional misrepresentation, breach
Citing Jacques, the court held that
lender owed a duty of care to loan
the applicants' processing fee.25

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.at 1052.
245. Id.at 1053.
246. Id.at 1050.
247. Id. at 1052. The court noted that the jury could have found the lender's
actions negligent and the borrowers' desire to construct a new home "predicated
on their receiving a low interest loan which they could afford." Id. at 1052-53.
But see Brasher v. First Alabama Real Estate Fin., Inc., 447 So. 2d 682 (Ala.
1984) (borrowers could not recover damages from lender on the theory that it was
obligated to obtain permanent financing once it began to do so by having a previous
lender transfer borrowers' file, since there was never an oral or written agreement
to obtain such financing).
248. 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987).
249. Id.at 1563.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1570. The court added:
Defendant's own alleged behavior supports this conclusion. The Complaint
alleges that defendant extended assurances that there were 'no problems'
with plaintiffs' application; this alleged statement implies that defendant
actually examined whether problems existed .... [D]efendant's alleged
acknowledgment of the application, and alleged attention to the application,
show that defendant understood itself to have a duty to plaintiffs.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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Negligent Approval of a Loan Application

A bank generally owes no "duty of due care" in its decision to approve
a loan sought by the borrower for a risky business venture. In Wagner
v. Benson,'2 2 the borrowers alleged that they suffered foreseeable harm
from the lender's negligence in loaning them money.23 Specifically, they
alleged that the lender should have known that the borrowers were inexperienced investors undertaking a risky venture. 4 A California court
held that the lender was not sufficiently involved in the borrowers' enterprise, a ranching operation, to impose a duty of care on the lender for
negligently loaning money.255 The court noted:
Liability to a borrower for negligence arises only when the lender "actively
participates" in the financed enterprise "beyond the domain of the usual
money lender." Normal supervision of the enterprise by the lender for
the protection of its security interest in loan collateral is not "active
participation." The Bank's limited involvement in the [enterprise] falls far
short of the extensive control and shared profits which give rise to liability. 6
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Gries v. First Wisconsin
NationalBank 57 held that where the evidence failed to show that the lender
made misrepresentations, that the lender possessed unique information re-

garding the transaction that it withheld from the borrowers, or that the

borrowers were incompetent, infirm or otherwise peculiarly dependent on
the advice of the lender, the lender was not liable for negligently loaning
money. 58

In Production Credit Association v. Croft, 9 the borrowers claimed
that the lender was negligent for making loans that the lender knew, or
should have known, the borrowers could not repay. 26 The court held that

252. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980).
253. Id. at 35, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 84 Wis. 2d 774, 264 N.W.2d 254 (1978).
258. Id. at 779-80, 264 N.W.2d at 257. The court noted:
[None of the evidence presented] by the plaintiffs can obscure the basic
fact that it was the plaintiffs who borrowed the money to open a business.
They called the bank; they prepared a proposal; they applied for the loan;
they invested the money in the business. Although the failure of the
business is unfortunate for both the plaintiffs and the bank, it was a risk
which the plaintiffs assumed, and which can not be shifted to the bank.
Id. at 780, 264 N.W.2d at 257.
259. 143 Wis. 2d 746, 423 N.W.2d 544 (Ct, App. 1988).
260. Id. at 757-58, 423 N.W.2d at 548.
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the lender did not owe a fiduciary duty to the borrowers, and denied
26
recovery. '
10. Negligent Failure on the Part of a Construction Lender to Detect
Defects and to Notify the Homebuyer-borrower of Those Defects
One variation on the normal lender liability case occurs where a homebuyer sues either his mortgage lender or the construction lender alleging
that it was negligent for failing to detect and warn of defects during
construction. Under this theory, plaintiffs have enjoyed little success.
In Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Association,262 the court
held that the lender owed a duty to purchasers of new homes to exercise
reasonable care to see that the homes were built free of "major structural
defects. '26 Connor is distinguishable from most fact patterns due to the
lender's extreme involvement in the construction process. In Connor, the
bank financed the developer's purchase of the land. The bank required
the developer to submit plans and specifications and suggested selling prices.
The bank also held a right of first refusal to supply mortgage loans to
purchasers, and received loan fees from the developer for every buyer who
obtained financing. If the purchaser obtained financing elsewhere, the
construction lender was entitled to receive fees and interest from the
developer.

264

Homeowners brought suit against a savings and loan association seeking
damages for breach of fiduciary duty in Clark v. Kansas Savings & Loan
Association.26 5 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant breached
2
its fiduciary duty when it failed to inspect the house during construction. 6
The plaintiff claimed that the builder constructed two bedrooms smaller
than the plans required and the defendant failed to discover the undersized
rooms. 267 Applying Kansas law, the court held that the making of periodic

inspections on the construction premises, without further involvement, con-

261.

Id. at 749-53, 423 N.W.2d at 546-48. The appellate court upheld the

trial court's dismissal of the negligence claim for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Id. at 758, 423 N.W.2d at 548. The court said that
the debtor's counterclaims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty were "so
'inextricably woven' that they present[ed] but one claim," and declined to offer
further analysis, except to say that its analysis under the fiduciary duty claim was
equally applicable to the negligence cause of action. Id.The court denied recovery
based on a breach of fiduciary duty. Id.See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying

text.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
Id. at 866, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
Id.at 860-61, 447 P.2d at 613-14, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74.
608 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
Id.at 494.
Id.
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stitutes normal procedures and did not subject the lender to liability.268
In Allison v. Home Savings Association,26 9 the plaintiffs, homeowners,
sued the construction lender for breach of an implied warranty of fitness
and for negligence. 270 The Missouri Court of Appeals suggested that under
the negligence cause of action, the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a
duty of care because its activities did not exceed those of the normal
lender. 271 The Allison court also noted that the Missouri legislature, like
other legislatures, had limited "the liability of a construction lender to
cases involving misrepresentation or activities outside the scope of a lender. 2 72
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 369.264 provides:
An association which makes a loan, the proceeds of which are used or
may be used by the borrower to finance the design, manufacture, construction, repair, modification or improvement of real or personal property
for sale or lease to others, shall not be held liable to the borrower or to
third persons for any loss or damage occasioned by any defect ... or

for any loss or damage resulting from the failure of the borrower to use

due care ... unless the association has knowingly been a party to mis-

representations with respect to such real or personal property.23

Thus, under Missouri law, a savings and loan association does not owe
the homebuyer-borrower a duty of care to detect and warn of defects
unless it is involved in a scheme to defraud the homebuyer-borrower or
its connection with the developer clearly goes beyond the normal scope of
activities of a construction lender.

268. Id. at 496.
269. 643 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
270. Id. at 850. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that the lender owed them a
duty to detect and warn of defects in construction. Id. at 851. The plaintiffs tried
their case solely based on the theory of breach of a vendor's implied warranty of
habitability. Id. The court noted that the question of whether the lender was liable
for negligence based on a duty to detect defects and warn was not properly preserved
for their determination. Id. at 852. Nevertheless, the court addressed this issue.
Id.
271. Id. at 852. The court noted:
Here, the record shows only that Home Savings financed the construction
of the subdivision, acquired title to the two properties after their construction, and later sold them. That does not constitute involvement in
the development and construction phases such as would justify a result
similar to that in Connor. Moreover, subsequent cases in California and
other jurisdictions have declined to impose liability on construction lenders
whose activities do not clearly exceed those of a normal lender.
Id.
272.
273.

Id.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 369.264 (1986). Note that the term "association"
pertains only to savings and loan associations. See Mo. REv. STAT. ,§ 369.014(3)

(1986).
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Negligent Administration of a Loan

Negligent administration of a loan generally occurs under a construction
loan. Often the borrower runs out of funds to complete the project. The
following cases discuss generally the administration of loans, and the type

of conduct by the lender that might give rise to a negligence claim.
In Brunswick Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,2 4 the lender sued
the Farmers Home Administration, after the borrower defaulted, seeking
reimbursement under the terms of a guaranty. 275 The government denied

liability, claiming that the bank had committed fraud and misrepresentation

in securing the guaranty and had negligently serviced the loan. 276 The court
held that the lender had negligently serviced the loan. 27" The court noted:
[T]he evidence clearly indicates that the bank disregarded many of its most
basic servicing obligations. Its predefault servicing activities indicate little
concern for reasonable banking practices, and there can be no doubt that
the government has shown the bank's servicing of the loan to be negligent
....

Because of the bank's negligence, the proper hazard insurance was

not obtained, large amounts of money intended for [the debtor corporation]
were instead used for the personal benefit of the individual and corporate
guarantors, and apparently only about half of the necessary construction
and acquisition and repair of machinery actually took place. The bank's
negligence thus had a direct bearing on the failure of the [debtor's] venture.
hold that the bank is not entitled to recover on the loan
Accordingly, we
278
note guaranty.

In Canterbury Realty & Equipment Corp. v. Poughkeepsie Savings
Bank, 2 9 the court held that the lender was not liable to the guarantor of
a note for negligence in administering a commercial loan. 2 0 In Canterbury,
the lender extended a revolving line of credit to the borrower, Canterbury
Realty.21 The borrower assigned its accounts receivable to the lender under
a "lock box" arrangement as security for the loan. 2 2 C.I., the parent
corporation of the borrower, and two of C.I.'s officers and shareholders
guaranteed the loan.2 3 Evidence at trial showed that the borrower's credit

274. 707 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
275. Id.at 1356-57.
276. Id.at 1357.
277. Id.at 1363.
278. Id.
279. 35 A.D.2d 102, 524 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1988).
280. Id. at 109, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
281. Id. at 103, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
282. Id. A lock box arrangement is a tool often employed by lenders. Under
the arrangement in this case, vendees of the borrower made payments directly to
a post office box in the lender's name. Id. at 103-04, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 532. Under
the loan agreement, the lender was obligated to apply the receipts from the lock
box against the borrowers credit line indebtedness within three days of receipt. Id.
283. Id.
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limit exceeded the authorized amount and was in part attributable to the
lender's failure to give timely credit to the borrower's receivables that it
collected.2 4 The plaintiffs, the borrower and its parent corporation, brought
suit, alleging among other things that the lender negligently administered
5
the loan.2
The court ruled that the trial court should have dismissed the negligence
cause of action because the lender owed no duty to the guarantor CI and
the borrower had dismissed the action in bankruptcy. 2 6 The court, however,
did not necessarily exclude future suits brought by borrowers against lenders
under this cause of action. In dicta, the court noted: "To whatever extent
the Bank may have owed a duty of care in managing the loan, contractually
based or otherwise, the duty was owed solely to the borrower, Canterbury. ' ' 2 7 Thus, a New York court might recognize a negligence cause of
action brought by a borrower against a lender.

12. Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as Basis for Tort
Claim

The doctrine of good faith and fair dealing, as indicated earlier, is
primarily a contract cause of action. This common-law doctrine, which is
implied in all contracts, 288 requires "that neither party will act to impair
the right of the other to receive the benefits which flow from their agreement
or contractual relationship."2 9 Missouri Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
section 1-203 provides that "every contact or duty within this chapter
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.' '29
Plaintiffs now seek to assert this duty of good faith and fair dealing as

284. Id. at 104-05, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
285. Id. at 105, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
286. Id. at 109, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 536. The court said:
As to C.I. [the parent corporation], the Bank owed no duty of care to
it to monitor the affairs of and manage the loan to Canterbury, C.l.'s
wholly owned subsidiary. Since C.I.'s damage, if any, in this regard is
entirely based on the loss in the value of its investment as the sole
stockholder in Canterbury, it has no standing to prosecute this claim for
a tortious injury to Canterbury.
Id.
287.
288.

Id.
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 388, 710 P.2d
1025, 1038 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); 5 WLLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 670 (W. Jaeger 3rd ed. 1961). See generally Comment, supra
note 42.
289. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 726 P.2d 565, 569-70 (1986).
290. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 400.1-203 (1986).
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the basis for not only a contract cause of action, but
tort claim as well. 291 The following cases examine this
The application of a tort duty of good faith first
cases. In Rawlings v. Apodaca,29 the court allowed an
in tort based on the insurer's breach of the duty of
court noted that

1045

for the basis of a
issue. 2u2
arose in insurance
insured to recover
good faith. 294 The

a tort action for breach of the implied covenant is more often recognized
where the contract creates a relationship in which the law implies special
duties not imposed on other contractual relationships. These relationships
are "characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary
responsibility." 2 1'

The Rawlings court also noted that the law sometimes imposes tort liability
where the relationship is common carrier-guest, innkeeper-guest, physicianpatient, and attorney-client. 2 6 The court concluded that the breach of
insurance contracts, when done in bad faith, makes tort remedies appropriate. 291 The court summarized its holding, saying:
[S]ome breaches of the implied covenant may not provide the basis for
tort recovery, although they may give rise to an action on the express
covenant in which contract rules of damages would be applicable. But in
special contractual relationships, when one party intentionally breaches the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and when contract remedies
serve only to encourage such conduct, it is appropriate to permit the
damaged party to maintain an action in tort and to recover tort damages. 298

The court recognized that unless a tort duty existed, parties have an
incentive to breach performance under the contract. 299 The court noted that
this is particularly true in insurance cases. 3°°
The court then addressed whether the application of punitive damages
was appropriate under a tortious breach of the duty of good faith and

291. See generally Lawrence & Wilson, Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes
and in Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63 IND. L.J. 825 (1987-88);
Comment, supra note 42, at 1196; Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract:
The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 377 (1986).
292. See generally Ellis & Gray, Lender Liability for Negligently Processing
Loan Applications, 92 DIcK. L. REv. 363, 389 (1988).
293. 151 Ariz. 149, 726 P.2d 565 (1986).
294.
295.

Id. at
Id. at

-,

,

726 P.2d at 576.
726 P.2d at 574 (quoting Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.,

Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 362 (1984)).
296. Id. at -, 726 P.2d at 575; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 314A (1965); PROSSER, supra note 86, § 92, at 660-62.
297.
298.
299.

Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at __ , 726 P.2d at 576.
Id. at
, 726 P.2d at 576.
Id. at __, 726 P.2d at 576.

300. Id. at
, 726 P.2d at 576.
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fair dealing. 01 The court began this analysis by noting that "[ilt is sufficient
to establish the tort of bad faith that the defendant has acted intentionally" 3°0
and that this action "may fall short of what is required for punitive damage
award." 3 The court restricted the availability of punitive damages to cases
' 4
in which the "defendant's wrongful conduct was guided by evil motives." 0
In Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank,0 5 the California
Court of Appeals held that banks owe a tort duty of good faith to depositors
of non-interest bearing checking accounts.2 6 In Commercial Cotton, depositors brought suit when the lender allegedly debited the depositors
account due to an unauthorized signature.3°7 The depositor sued for breach
of good faith in tort because the bank refused to reimburse the depositor,
claiming that the statute of limitations barred recovery. 08 The court analogized the banking industry to the insurance industry, noting: "[B]anking
and insurance have much in common, both being highly regulated industries
performing vital public services substantially affecting the public welfare
....
The relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary
"309

301. Id. at
726 P.2d at 577.
302. Id. at
726 P.2d at 577.
303. Id. at
726 P.2d at 578. The court noted:
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required
for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or
outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive on the
part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of
the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.
Id. at -, 726 P.2d at 578 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 86, § 2, at 910) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
304. Id. at -, 726 P.2d at 578. The court further noted:
[Punitive damages] are recoverable in bad faith tort actions when, and
only when, the facts establish that defendant's conduct was aggravated,
outrageous, malicious or fraudulent. Indifference to facts or failure to
investigate are sufficient to establish the tort of bad faith but may not
rise to the level required by the punitive damage rule.
Id. at -,
726 P.2d at 578 (citations omitted).
305. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
306. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554. Prior to Commercial Cotton, California
had extended the tort action to include insurance contracts and other "special
relationships." See also Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,
36 Cal. App. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (allowing recovery
in tort for breach of implied covenant of good faith in an ordinary commercial
contract).
307. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 514, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
308. Id. at 514, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
309. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554. As to the suggestion that the bank
provides a service to the depositor, the court noted:
A depositor in a noninterest-bearing checking account, except for state or
federal regulatory oversight, is totally dependant on the banking institution
to which it entrusts deposited funds and depends on the bank's honesty
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6
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-,
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In First National Bank v. Twombly, 310 a bank initiated an action to
recover on a delinquent promissory note, and the borrower counterclaimed,
arguing that the bank's acceleration of the maturity date and subsequent
wrongful offset was in bad faith."' At trial, the jury awarded borrower
$4,000, which the court offset against the balance owed on the note, the
interest accrued, and the bank's attorney's fees.312 In addition to actual
damages, the borrowers sought punitive damages, but the trial court did
14
13
not allow plaintiffs to submit this to the jury. The borrowers appealed.
The Montana Supreme Court held that "[w]hen the duty to exercise good
faith is imposed by law, rather than the contract itself ... the breach of
that duty is tortious. ' ' 31 5. The court further held that the borrower may
31 6
recover punitive damages if the bank's conduct is sufficiently culpable,
317
and remanded for a trial on that issue.
Missouri plaintiffs have a much more difficult task in proceeding under
this theory. In Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co.,318 the Court
held that there is no independent tort cause of action for breach of the
U.C.C. duty of good faith.3 1 9 The Court noted: "The obligation of good
faith appertains to the performance or enforcement of every contract duty
under the Code. § 400.1-203. The remedy for breach of the obligation of
good faith under the Code, §§ 400.1-203 and 400.1-208, accordingly, is a
' ' 32
contract, and not a tort remedy. 0

and expertise to protect them. While banks do provide services for the
depositor by way of monitoring deposits and withdrawals, they do so for
the very commercial purpose of making money by using the deposited
funds.
Id.
310. 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984).
311. Id. at 67, 689 P.2d at 1227.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 67-68, 689 P.2d at 1227.
314. Id. at 68, 689 P.2d at 1227.
315. Id. at 73, 689 P.2d at 1230. In Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 217 Mont.
196, 704 P.2d 409 (1985), the same court said:
[Tihe jury heard evidence on the bank's conduct that might support a
finding of reckless disregard for [the borrower's] rights; the bank stands
in the position of superior bargaining power to its customer that was
noted in Twombly; and the evidence might support a finding that the
bank breached an obligation to [the borrower]. We are not holding that
every contract or statutorily imposed obligation, alone, carries with it an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the breach of which
permits recovery in tort. We hold only that the District Court, under these
circumstances, did not err when it instructed the jury to consider recovery
under tort principles, and, accordingly, punitive damages.
Id. at 211-12, 704 P.2d at 419.
316. Twombly, 213 Mont. at 211-12, 689 P.2d at 419.
317. Id. at 211-12, 689 P.2d at 419.
318. 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
319. Id. at 527.
320. Id. at 536.
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The Court upheld the summary judgment on the tort cause of action
for breach of good faith.32 ' The Rigby court noted, however, that plaintiffs
may bring a tortious breach of good faith claim where they can point to
non-Code law for a remedy. 322 Rigby's significance can also be found in
its definition of the good faith standard in Missouri. Defendant's conduct
must be "honesty in fact," regardless of the "unreasonableness of that
323
conduct by any commercial standard."
III.

PUBLIC POLICY RATIONALE FOR AND AGAINST LnmrNG LENDER
LIaBrry

Lenders, like other businesses and professions, are judged by standards
of good faith (under contract law) and reasonableness (under tort law).
There is no doubt that litigation of lender liability suits has dramatically
increased over the past decade. There is debate, however, over whether
the traditional justice system of trial by juries can effectively handle these
actions. Lenders, once protected and favored by the judicial system, now
cry "FOUL!" They allege that both judges and juries are naturally sympathetic to the plaintiffs, creating an unfair playing field: "Jurors typically
perceive the farmer-banker relationship as David against Goliath and, as
a result, routinely award large verdicts to punish banks for what they think
is malicious or outrageous conduct." 324
To what standards should society hold the banking industry? Traditionally, defendant's actions are measured by objective standards, i.e., did
the loan officer do what a reasonableperson would do "under the same
or similar circumstances? '"121
Critics of lender liability suggest that the law
should judge banks by a lesser standard-subjective reasonableness. The
inquiry under a subjective standard is whether the lender believed his actions
or judgment was appropriate.
Should banks, because of the role they play in the economic world,
be judged by different standards that other defendants? Will the application
of normal tort principles against lenders cause economic turmoil and do
more harm than good?
One author suggests that in those decisions effecting the extension of
new credit after a loan is due, banks should be judged by a subjective
test rather than the traditional objective reasonableness test. The author
argues:

321. Id. at 535-37. The Court also upheld the summary judgment on the
fraud and prima facie tort claims. Id. at 548.
322. Id. at 536-37. Since the plaintiff in Rigby failed to plead or otherwise
assert a non-Code breach, he failed to state a cause of action and summary
judgment was proper. Id.
323. Id. at 526-27.
324. Cappello, One Farmer's Resolution, W. BANKER, May 1986, at 27.
325. See PROSSER, supra note 86, at 175.
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To measure the lender's decision not to extend new credit after a loan is
due and in default against an objective reasonableness standard would
place an undue burden on the lenders. While a lender must objectively
act in good faith under the terms of an existing loan, the requirement to
act in good faith when making a new loan after the existing loan is due
would place a burden on the lender by making it difficult to terminate
credit. Thus, a lender's decision not to extend new credit, from an objective
standpoint, may not have been commercially reasonable, but, from a more
subjective standpoint, may have been made by the officer of the3' lender
6
based on his or her fear that the bank's position is jeopardized. " 1

If, in fact, the borrower is in default, the application of objective
standards to the lender would net the same result as the foregoing approach.

When using an objective test, the court asks the jury whether a reasonable
person, knowing all of the facts known by the defendant, would have
acted in the same way. If such a person knows that the borrower is already
in default, it is reasonable not to extend new credit.
This same logic applies to the extension of new credit if the loan
officer knows that the borrower's trustworthiness is questionable, and
suspects that the borrower will not meet its financial obligations. Any loan
officer, being a "man of ordinary prudence ' 3 27 and knowing these same
things would be hesitant to extend financing.
The author cited above also suggests that lenders should make their
credit decisions based on their own internal standards which exist at the
time. 128 Under such an approach, the lender is not liable unless it applies
these internal standards in some arbitrary or capricious manner. 29 If this

theory were to apply, each lender in essence would determine its own
lending standards rather than adhere to an industry-wide standard. Certainly,

this type of approach is not in the best interests of society and would be
a throwback to the dark ages of tort law. 3 0

326. See Bahls, supra note 8, at 258.
327. Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837). See PROSSER, supra
note 86, at 174 n.4.
328. The author suggests:
Borrowers can have no more justifiable expectation than to expect that
the lender will make the credit decision in accordance with its standards
at the time the credit decision is to be made. Because of the nature of
lending standards, the standards should not be measured against an objective reasonable lending standard.
Bahls, supra note 8, at 265.
329. Id. at 266.
330. Prosser writes:
The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard
of behavior. Yet the infinite variety of situations which may arise make
it impossible to fix definite rules in advance for all conceivable human
conduct. The utmost that can be done is to devise something in the nature
of a formula, the application of which in each particular case must be
left to the jury, or to the court. The standard of conduct which the
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Critics of lender liability suggest that under the current system, recovery
against lenders will create unforeseen bank losses. In particular, their concern
is with the amount of punitive damages. One critic noted: "We're getting
huge punitive damage verdicts. This is a problem for the industry, because
there's no way a bank can figure into its pricing structure the cost to the
institution of a punitive damage award." 33 ' These unforeseen losses, they
argue, are particularly devastating to already troubled small banks and
savings and loan institutions.
There is also a concern that the fear of lender liability losses will force
banks to give fewer loans, especially to those with only marginal credit
ratings-like entrepreneurs, small businesses and young people.332 One author suggests:
As in any other business, lenders make decisions based on the relative
amount of risk and reward. Because the amount of a lender's reward
(rate of interest) is limited by law (usury statutes), lenders are hesitant to
make loans unless the amount of risk can be controlled. Risks entail the
possibilities of failure of the farm, decline in value or dissipation of the
collateral, bankruptcy of the farmer; but should not include excessive risks
of lawsuit if the lender denies further credit after the loan is due. In those
cases where the risks associated with extending credit are nearly equal to
the rewards, additional risk such as a substantial expansion of the theory
of lender liability will tip the balance against extending credit to farmers
or other borrowers if the lender believes they are litigious. If the balance
is tipped in that direction, the marginal borrowers who need credit the
most may be excluded from credit markets. 3
Critics also charge that many lender liability suits lack merit. Instead,
critics suggest that bankrupt debtors use them merely as stalling tactics to
delay foreclosure suits brought by the lender. Similarly, critics suggest that
borrowers use these suits, or the threat of filing, as leverage while renegotiating an agreement with the lender.
Finally, critics charge that lenders are in essence becoming insurers,
even though it is the borrower who is in the best position to prevent
financial loss. To shift the losses to the lender, they suggest, is simply
unfair. "The costs of incorrect decisions, whether or not the decisions

community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than
the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor .... At
the same time, it must make proper allowance for the risk apparent to
the actor, for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under
which he must act.
The courts have dealt with this very difficult problem by creating a
fictious person, who never has existed on land or sea: the "reasonable
man of ordinary prudence."
PROSSER, supra note 86, at 173-74.
331. Moss, Borrowers Fight Back with Lender Liability, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1987, at 64, 68.
332. See Bahls, supra note 8, at 258-60.
333. Id. at 258-59.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/6

42

Rithie: Rithie: Lender Liability in Missouri

LENDER LIABILITY IN MISSOURI

19891

1051

were warranted at the time, should be borne by those who have the
greatest
33 4
opportunity to control the risks, in most cases, the borrowers.
Some states, recognizing these concerns, and feeling the pressure of
lobby efforts by the banking industry, have attempted to limit lender liability
by statute.3 35 These statutes generally put a cap on punitive damages or
have amended their statute of frauds provision so as to prevent enforcement
of oral commitments to lend above a specified amount. Naturally, the
plaintiff's bar in these states have lobbied vehemently in opposition to
such legislation. Advocates of lender liability argue that by limiting liability,
36
the threat of being sued has a minimal deterrent effect.
While some of the criticisms expressed represent valid concerns, they
apply to the tort recovery system as a whole, not just suits brought against
lenders. Within the tort system, as it now exists, lenders should not be
treated differently from other defendants. This fact becomes evident when

one remembers that the concept of "lender liability" largely represents the
application of old principles against lenders, not new causes of action. In
other words, the legal theories are not merely current fashionable causes
of actions which might quickly fade, but rather theories plaintiffs have
used for centuries. Should the law hold banks, managed and staffed by
Ivy League MBA's to lower standards of reasonableness than other businesses? The answer is simply no-that within the current tort recovery
system lenders, despite their important role as economic middleman, should
be treated like everyone else. Lenders should not be insurers of the borrower's financial success, but instead should bear part of the financial
burden when their own actions contribute, in a significant part, to the
borrower's economic problems.
IV.

WHAT

BANKs SuouLD Do To PROTECT THEMSELVES
A.

Documentation

Many commentators, as well as those individuals on the "Lender
Liability Seminar Circuit," suggest that the best protection against lender

334. Id. at 260-61.
335. See ColoradoAdopts Bill to Limit Liability on CreditAgreement, Rejects
Branching, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) 481 (Feb. 27, 1989). Colorado House Bill 1116
which would not allow a debtor to bring or maintain an action relating to a credit
agreement involving a principal amount in excess of $25,000, unless the agreement
is in writing and signed by the bank. The bill also provides that a credit agreement
"may not be implied under any circumstance, including, without limitation, from
the relationship, fiduciary or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor or from
performance or partial performance by or on behalf of the creditor, debtor or
promissory estoppel." Id.
336. The Texas Trial Lawyers Association fought the adoption of any bill
which would limit liability. "If car dealers can be held liable [for oral representations], why not bankers? Fraud is fraud.... The way to get rid of fraud is
not to make it inactionable but to make it unprofitable." See Texas Senate to
Hear Liability Testimony, INsTrrrTIONAL INVESTOR, INC., BANK LETTER, Feb. 27,
Published
1989, byatUniversity
_. of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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liability is effective documentation. While effective documentation is a
necessary part of an "overall protection plan," it is not in itself the
solution. To the contrary, documentation may have just the opposite effectit might create liability, or, more precisely, define the standard by which
juries will judge the lender. One author has noted:
Of course, the contents of loan manuals and the curricula of seminars
are matters discoverable by an adversary in a lender liability suit, and in
them will be found not a general standard of good faith and fair dealing,

but a detailed description of the conduct which the lending institution
finds appropriate.

The risk is that the lender-defendant will have thus defined a precise
standard of conduct for its own loan officers, one by which their conduct
will later be judged in the courtroom. And failure to follow the detailed
instruction in a loan manual-or the recommendations of an expert panelmay be taken (and possibly mistaken) as evidence of bad faith or unfair
dealing. What may truly be nothing more than a banker exercising sound
judgment, based upon years of experience, in shaping loan policy or practice
to fit the needs of a3 7potential or actual borrower can thus become a basis
for lender liability.
The author quoted above quite properly understands the importance
of effective documentation. What is important is not the number of things
that the lender documents, but rather the type of things that it chooses
to document. For example, a lender should document the subjective reasons
that it decided to terminate credit or not to extend credit. Documentation
should bolster the lender's case, not provide a smoking gun for the plaintiff's
attorneys to uncover during discovery. Thus, the documentation must reflect
intelligent, calculated decisions made by the lender. It is therefore necessary
to first create an "overall protection plan," designed to limit the lender's
liability. Once the protection plan is working, the lender should then
document how it has effectively executed the plan.
B. Developing a Protection Plan
In developing an overall protection plan designed to limit their liability
to borrowers, lenders should do the following: (1) Always be upfront and
honest with the borrower, even though they may lose a client; (2) notify
the borrower promptly that he is in default or that the bank will not
extend additional credit (i.e., Don't delay the inevitable!); (3) consider the
use of exculpatory language, especially where the lender and borrower are
on relatively equal bargaining ground; (4) treat all accepted loan applications
as valid contracts; (5) purchase liability insurance; (6) consider including
jury waivers in the loan agreement; (7) consider the use of arbitration
clauses; (8) make sure they are using current document forms approved

337. McCabe, supra note 1.
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by legal counsel; and (9) develop a "risk-management program." 338
Be upfront and honest with the borrower. No one likes to be the
bearer of bad news, and no one likes to turn away a prospective client.
Nevertheless, loan officers should be upfront with the borrower-even if
it means telling them that the bank cannot provide new or additional
financing. Do not unreasonably raise the borrower's expectations, because
to do so risks a lawsuit based on misrepresentation.
Notify the borrower promptly when trouble shows up. Common sense
dictates notifying the borrower early of pending trouble, so she may have
time to make alternative arrangements. By falling to notify the borrower,
especially under a line of credit loan, the bank may be subjecting itself
to a claim of bad faith.
Consider the use of exculpatory language. Exculpatory language, such
as expressly agreeing that the lender does not owe a fiduciary duty to the
borrower and is not liable for acts which might otherwise constitute negligence, may prove fruitless. In fact, such contractual language may be

damaging to the lender if the borrower is able to introduce it into evidence.
Nevertheless, where the parties are on equal bargaining ground the use of
such language may be useful to effectively allocate the risks by contractual
agreement. By no means should the lender rely on such language as a
safety net, but should consider its inclusion into loan agreements.
3 39
Treat loan application, once accepted, as a valid contract.
Remember,
once the lender has accepted the application along with the processing fee,
there is a good chance it has entered into a binding contractual agreement.
The lender should treat its relationship with the borrower as if a contractual
relationship exists. It should act in good faith and deal fairly with its
borrowers to diminish its chances of being sued.
Consider purchasing liability insurance designed specifically to meet
your needs. Lenders might consider purchasing insurance designed especially
to protect them against lender liability. Comprehensive general liability
policies generally give little or no coverage to situations in which borrowers
can hold lenders liable.3 4 In addition, directors' and officers' liability often
fails to provide the necessary coverage. 3 4'
Consider including jury waivers in the loan agreements. The possibility
of being hit with a large plaintiff's verdict is more likely to occur where

338. See generally McCabe, supra note 1.
339. See Ellis & Gray, Lender Liability for Negligently Processing Loan
Applications, 92 DICK. L. REv. 363, 389 (1988). The authors state: "When a lender
holds itself out to the public as a source of loans based on predetermined eligibility
standards, the lender implicitly promises to make loans to qualified applicants in
the amount, at the rate, and for the term advertised .... ." Id.
340. Brenner, Reaction Mixed to Insurance for Consumer Lending Liability,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1988, at 2.
341. Id.
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a jury is involved and thus the lender should consider including jury waivers
in the loan documents. Nevertheless, inclusion of jury waiver language is
like a two-edged sword-if the court enforces the waiver, it might save
the lender a lot of money if it is ultimately liable. If for any reason,
however, the court does not uphold the waiver, such attempt may infuriate
should use
the jury which may lead to an even larger verdict. Lenders
3 42
involved.
risks
the
understand
and
care
great
these with
Consider using arbitration as a means of settling disputes that arise

with your borrowers.141 Currently only a small number of commercial lenders
routinely put arbitration clauses into their loan agreements. 3 " These arbitration agreements provide that if a dispute arises, both parties agree to
settle it through binding arbitration.3 45 Advocates of arbitration clauses
suggest that if lenders insert them into loan agreements the process for
working out disputes is in place long before the disputes arise, saving the
parties both time and money.
Despite the attractiveness of arbitration agreements, banks have been
reluctant to put them into loan agreements, though this may be changing.
To some lenders, using arbitration agreements is like using a prenuptial
agreement-who wants to talk about impending bad times before they
happen? 46 Perhaps another reason banks in the past have reluctant to
arbitrate was their ability to outlast most borrowers in expensive litigation. 47
This sense of security may no longer hold true, especially since plaintiff's
firms are now willing to take these cases on contingency fees. This, along
with the increasing number of large jury verdicts, may cause banks to
rethink their position on binding arbitration agreements. One article suggests
that it may be the borrower's attorney, rather than bank counsel, who
48
objects to the imposition of an arbitration clause in a consumer loan.1
Critics of arbitration clauses point to the following shortcomings: (1)
the inability to appeal unless the decision is "egregious;" (2) the tendency
of the arbitrator to "split the baby;" and (3) the possibility that the one
arbitrator may be biased or irrational. 49 As to the threat of one irrational
arbitrator, some suggest that this problem can be overcome by using a

342.

See McCabe, supra note 1, at

_

.

343.

See generally Forde, Alternative to the Courtroom: Lenders Urged to
Build Arbitration into Loan Contracts, AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1988, at 10.
344. Id. One such bank is the Bank of America, San Francisco.

345.

"A written agreement to submit a present or future controversy to

arbitration is 'valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist

at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract'-both under the Federal
and Missouri Acts [9 U.S.C. § 2]." Village of Cairo v. Bodine Contracting Co.,
685 S.W.2d 253, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).

346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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panel of three arbitrators.350 Lenders should give strong consideration to
using arbitration as a means of settling their disputes with borrowers,
keeping in mind the criticisms noted above.
Maintain and use only current loan documents. It almost goes without
saying that lenders should use only up-to-date loan forms that their legal
counsels have approved. In addition to prospectively using current forms,
lenders may want to review existing loan agreements, especially those that
might suggest that the lender has the right to exercise some control over

the borrowers.
Finally, lenders should develop a risk managementprogram. One author
notes that an effective risk prevention program must include an early
warning system, where the lender monitors those borrowers who appear
unhappy. 5 ' When signs of unhappiness arise, lenders are then able to
confront the problem before the friction escalates and ends in a costly
lawsuit.
In addition to monitoring the satisfaction of its borrowers, the lender
should see to it that the borrower understands with whom he or she is
dealing. The bank is not merely an entity but rather an organization with
a definite chain of command. The borrower should know who to talk to
on a day to day basis, and who to complain to when he or she is
dissatisfied. 5 2 The more knowledgeable the borrower is about the internal
structure of the lender, the less likely problems in communication will exist.
One commentator notes:
What is required, in short, is a recognition that any lending institution
seriously concerned about its exposure to lender liability should undertake
a comprehensive review not only of its documentation, but of every step
in its lending and loan enforcement processes, with effective risk management the goal. That review, and the crafting of a risk management
program, should be undertaken under the guidance of, and with the benefit
of counseling from, lawyers whose experience is in the courtroom, who
know how to create and preserve evidence of good faith and fairness in
a lending relationship from its inception to its demise.353
V.

CONCLUSION

The 1980's have seen a drastic change in the relationship between
lenders and their borrowers. Due in part to the banking industry's own
self-promotion, borrowers are no longer merely debtors but instead "clients," who expect the lender to treat them fairly and professionally. When

treated unreasonably and backed into corners, borrowers no longer throw

350. Id.
351. McCabe, supra note 1.
352. Id. at
353. Id.at
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their hands up in disgust. Instead, the borrower bites the hand that once
fed them. At the very least, the "game has changed," and lenders must
learn the new rules to play.
CRAio D. RITCHIE
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